Charlotte Alderwick (University of the West of England) ‘Schelling’s Virtues’

In the literature on Schelling there has been a notable absence of work discussing the question of what a Schellingian ethics does or could look like. There are a number of reasons for this, not least the fact that, despite his clear interest in freedom and lived subjective experience, Schelling himself devotes almost no explicit attention in his writings to the question of how to live an ethical life. Further, the dominant reading of Schelling’s conception of freedom casts him as a peculiar kind of determinist, committed to the claim that agents choose their own essence in an act which precedes their temporal life, and which then fully determines their actions and character within the temporal realm. Assuming this account of human agency, developing an account of how best to act or how to live a good life becomes futile, as temporal agents (on this view) are fundamentally incapable of modifying their behaviour in the ways required for a normative project to be coherent. Therefore, the little work which does exist on ethics in Schelling stresses the value of knowledge – Schelling becomes a quasi-Spinozist who places ethical value on gaining knowledge of the causes through which one is determined, and on the intellectual quietude which comes along with the knowledge that one’s fate in the world has already been set (albeit by one’s own free choice in some kind of extra-temporal realm).

In this paper I want to challenge the dominant view of Schelling’s conception of freedom, and to argue that once we have a better understanding of what freedom is for Schelling we can develop an ethics which is more in line with Schelling’s emphasis on activity, creativity, and freedom. I present an account of Schelling’s view of freedom as involving a continual process of interaction between an agent and her essence, such that the agent’s temporal life can be seen as an ongoing project of self-creation. Given this view of freedom, I claim that Schelling is best understood as advocating a kind of virtue ethics; encouraging the agent to actively shape her life and her character in such a way as to live a life which is harmonious with the whole. I finish by considering what kinds of values would come out as virtuous on this account, and briefly sketch the kind of ethical prescriptions these values might entail.
I will examine the consensual definition of life as “vegetation” in the second half of the 17th century: my aim is to show how both scientific and theological concerns complicate the so-called Aristotelian notion of vegetation and its relationship with sensitive functions. First, I will begin with the notion of life assumed by Nehemiah Grew and discussed at the very beginning of the 18th century by Jean Leclerc, Pierre Bayle and G. W Leibniz. This debate, well-known as “the controversy on the plastic natures,” has been extensively studied. But scholars usually focused on Cudworth, and on the metaphysical implications of this debate, to the detriment of the extension (or reference) of the concept of life. And yet, if we carefully examine what the authors of that time regarded as “living,” or caused by a “vital energy,” we see how the limits ascribed to the group of “living beings” do not correspond to what we consider today to be “alive.” I will propose two explanations for this discrepancy. The first one is the vagueness of the notion of vegetation due to the great numbers of the limiting cases observed by scientists: mold, coral and even fossils. Do these things “vegetate”? Are they animate? Organic? These cases were not new in themselves, but the recent developments of the anatomy of plants, on the one hand, and of microscopic observations, on the other hand, shed a different light on them. Grew precisely published in 1682 an *Anatomy of Plants* presenting a micro-structural description of plants. The second explanation of this discrepancy is the theological implication of “life.” According to Grew, life, being “more excellent” than mere physical motion, requires an “Excellent, and so a distinct Subject, to which it belongs. And therefore something, which is Substantial, yet Incorporeal” (*Cosmologia sacra or a Discourse of the Universe as it is the Creature and Kingdom of God*, 1701). Vegetation, as the lowest common denominator of the group of things or properties that are called ‘vital,’ is seen as a proof of the presence of God everywhere throughout the whole universe. This apologetic function of vegetation confuses the boundaries of the vegetative realm, since everything that does not seem purely material is depicted as vital and incorporeal. For instance, colours, odours, magnetic inclination and gravitation are equally regarded as produced by a vital energy. Finally, I will try to clarify the use of the different terms *vegetation, vegetative, living beings, life, alive and vital*. 
It is morally impossible, Locke argues, for a people to institute a government with absolute power over themselves. Political power is necessarily fiduciary; the people cannot but retain supreme authority and considerable rights of resistance. Locke’s argument for this provocative conclusion is theological in nature. “No Man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which he hath not in himself, a Power over his own Life” (Second Treatise, §24). Our life is not our own. It belongs to God, in virtue of having created us (§6). For this reason, individuals cannot possibly sell themselves into slavery, or, what is equivalent for Locke, subject themselves to the absolute arbitrary rule of another (§149).

This paper explores the conceptual presuppositions of Locke’s argument. It does so by comparing Locke’s conceptions of self-ownership and absolutism with those of Grotius and Hobbes. Locke’s argument is often taken to be a rejection of Grotius (e.g. Baumgold 2010: 43). The Dutch jurist had notoriously defended the legal possibility of political absolutism by analogy with self-enslavement:

> It is lawful for any Man to engage himself as a Slave to whom he pleases… Why should it not therefore be as lawful for a People that are at their own Disposal, to deliver up themselves to any one or more Persons, and transfer the Right of governing them upon him or them, without reserving any Share of that Right to themselves? (DJBP 1.3.8.1)

However, Grotius states in the self-same text that ‘the Right over our own Lives is not in ourselves, but in GOD’ (2.19.5.4). While natural reason suggests that the right to life may like any other property title be transferred voluntarily to another party, the Gospel teaches us that the ultimate dominium over our person belongs to God (2.19.5.4; 3.2.6; 3.11.18.1).

We argue that Locke’s arguments are premised on a Hobbesian, not a Grotian conception of absolute rule. For Grotius, absolute rule does not presuppose sovereign’s ownership of citizens’ lives. It merely entails a complete absence of rights of resistance. While it is morally impermissible for absolute sovereigns to kill innocent citizens, the latter may not resist such injustices. Hobbes did conceptualize absolute rule in terms of ownership. For him, all sovereignty is patrimonial and analogous to the master-slave relation. Slaves are owned unconditionally by their master, who may ‘dispose’ of them ‘as he pleases’ without wronging them (Elements 22.5; De Cive 8.5). It is this conception of absolute rule, we argue, which is presupposed in Locke’s critique of absolutism. Our reconstruction of these unpalatable set of arguments shall shed new light on rival conceptualizations of absolutism and rights of resistance in the classical social contract tradition, allowing us to reassess the cogency of Locke’s argument against the possibility of instituting absolute rule.
Fabrizio Baldassarri (Bar-Ilan University) Early Modern Reinterpretations of the Vegetative Soul in Alchemical and Mechanical Strands. The case of René Descartes and Guy de La Brosse

The resolution to reinterpret traditional Scholastic features under a new light characterized early XVII-century. The goal of this talk is to probe more deeply into an understudied topic, the *anima vegetativa*, in order to reconstruct how much early modern philosophers dealt with the basic operations of life (nutrition, accretion, and generation) traditionally related to the vegetative soul. Prefaced by a discussion on souls, in the Scholastic tradition any explanation of living functions started from the definition of the vegetative soul as it was endowed with the lowest faculties of living bodies and characterized the first and simplest operative stages of life. Yet, the Scholastic understanding of the vegetative soul led to philosophical complicacies and physiological ineffectiveness.

Early modernity tried to face the difficulties this feature raised to the interpretation of living bodies, trying to accustom the recent medical discoveries with a more modern philosophical system. This paper focuses on two contemporary but antithetical attempts, the alchemical case, endorsed by Guy de La Brosse (1586-1641), one of the firsts French Paracelsians, and the mechanical case, personified by René Descartes (1596-1650).

Royal physician and founder of the Jardin des Plantes, Guy de La Brosse proposed an alchemical explanation of the vegetative soul in his *De la Nature, vertu et utilité des plantes* (1628). The botanical philosophy contained in this volume shows his chemical experimentation, achieved not only to prepare vegetal remedies, but also to understand the inner features of plants through their perceptible effects. Accordingly, his chemical analysis revealed the virtues of plants, as bodies made of inert matter (deprived of souls) informed by agents that defined their degree of animation and life. By contrast, while proposing an alternative and mechanical understanding of living bodies as machines, in a very understudied manuscript with laboratorial notes on plants, the *Excerpta Anatomica* (ca. 1637), Descartes reduced the functions of the vegetative soul to his mechanization of nature. He described the operations traditionally attributed to the vegetative soul as vegetative powers mechanically working. Yet, as he used nutrition and digestion to differentiate living from inert bodies, an activity (*immutatione*) defines the vegetative powers and characterizes life.

The goal of this talk is to delve into these two alternative interpretations, which grounded the early modern understanding of living bodies. Furthermore, while analyzing the differences, in this talk I will show the affinities and an interconnection between Descartes and La Brosse. In its development from a *scientia de anima* to a science of life, naturalistic intersections emerge between the alchemical and mechanical new efforts to explain the basic functions of life, making the vegetative soul an intriguing feature of early modern philosophy.
Michael Beaney (King’s College London-Humboldt Universität zu Berlin) and Siobhan Chapman (Liverpool) Susan Stebbing’s Role in Twentieth-Century British Philosophy

This talk will elucidate the important role that Susan Stebbing played in British philosophy in the twentieth century, focusing on developments in analytic philosophy from the 1920s to 1940s and considering subsequent developments in linguistics.
Irene Binini (Scuola Normale Superiore) ‘Syllogistic, Tense and Modality in the Dialectica of Peter Abelard’

As is well known, Abelard’s greatest interest in the Dialectica is to develop a theory of topical inferences and a sentential logic. However, the twelfth century logician also attempts there to provide a theory of syllogistic inferences, which includes an analysis of assertoric syllogistic as well as a discussion of syllogisms varied in tense and modality (see in particular [1] 245-249). Abelard had but a superficial knowledge of the system Aristotle presented in the Prior Analytics, which he might have seen but was certainly not familiar to him. Also, he had no access to a tradition of commentaries on the Aristotelian doctrine, and this is probably why his remarks on the nature and rules of syllogistic inferences are rather brief and sketchy. Moreover, his approach to syllogistic is more taxonomic than systematic, in the sense that he seems to be more interested in proposing examples of valid and invalid syllogisms, than in providing a systematic theory about the nature of syllogistic inferences (see [5] p.119-121).

Despite this conciseness, however, it has been argued that Abelard’s system presents several elements of originality, in particular for what concerns his treatment of modal and temporal syllogisms. Paul Thom has claimed that indeed, although no complete theory is explicitly outlined, a valid system of modal syllogisms - substantially different from the Aristotelian one - might be drawn out from the Dialectica. This system would be based on Abelard’s modal semantics, that defines the meaning of modal operators in terms of compatibility with nature, on the de rebus analysis of modal propositions, and on Abelard’s distinction between inferentia and comitatio (on this, see in particular [4] p.52-64, [2] and [3]). The aim of my paper is to examine Abelard’s syllogistic, focusing in particular on his theory of temporal and modal syllogisms. I will consider the position Thom has advanced defending the validity of the system provided by Abelard, as well as several objections that may be raised against such a position, one of which concerns the acceptability of Abelard’s rules of conversions for modal propositions, which, as Thom himself noted, seem not to hold if we interpret modal propositions as being de rebus.
Joshua Black (Sheffield) Peirce on Possessing Habits and Believing Propositions

One of Charles Peirce’s primary philosophical aims was to provide an account of thought that does not restrict it to an internal process, avoiding ‘that narrow sense [of 'thought'] in which silence and darkness are favorable to thought’ (EP2:337, 1905). Rather, we are to think of thought as present ‘in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world’ (CP4.551, 1906). One important plank of Peirce’s account is the close relationship he forges between the acceptance of a proposition and the possession of a habit. This paper shows how two of Peirce’s semiotic generalisations of the proposition, the ‘dicisign’ and the ‘pheme’, enable Peirce to draw propositional knowledge and habituation together (especially deliberately developed habituation).

I begin by introducing Peirce’s conception of habit as ‘general laws of action’ (CP2.148, 1902). In this promiscuous sense even rocks have habits. The real focus of Peirce’s connection between thought and habit is habit development (e.g. EP2:269, 1903). This can occur through physical processes (e.g. evolution, erosion), but in creatures like us it also occurs through deliberate self-control. I note two important features of deliberately developed habits:

1. They structure the imagination of the habit possessor (e.g. CP2.148, 1902).
2. They determine how the habit possessor will behave when acting deliberately (e.g. EP2:12, 1895).

Peirce’s ‘dicisign’ generalises from the subject-predicate structure of a standard linguistically-expressible proposition into an index-icon structure (EP2:277, 1903). I explain this and show, following Stjernfelt’s recent work, that this move enables Peirce to include a much wider range of signs than usually captured by the propositional (Stjernfelt 2014). Icons include linguistic predicates, but also both static and moving visual images. This enables us to think of habits of imagination as, at least internally, expressing propositions, and of external gestures that manifest those habits as enunciations of a proposition.

The dicisign is characterised as the kind of sign that conveys information and is manifested both in indicative sentences, and the wider combinations made possible by Peirce’s account of the icon and index. The ‘pheme’ extends further into the interrogative and imperative moods (CP4.538, 1906; c.f. Bellucci 2014). According to the pragmatic maxim, we are to think of a judgment in imperative form in terms of ‘practical maxims’, which are conditionals whose consequents are imperatives (EP2:135, 1903). Accepting such a conditional is, on Peirce’s view, to possess a habit. But we can read this the other way as well. I argue that to have a self-controlled habit of acting is to accept this kind of conditional proposition (or ‘pheme’). However, given Peirce’s account of the dicisign, the possessor of this habit need not be able to express this conditional in words.
Nicolaus Taurellus (b. 1547 Montbéliard, d. 1606 Altdorf) is one of the early modern German philosophers who re-established metaphysics as a topic of serious academic inquiry in the Lutheran tradition. He adhered to the pious goal of providing a unified account of philosophical and theological truth, but in doing so he developed a series of controversial claims, such as the view that the basic constituents of reality are immaterial, form-like entities. In the present paper, I explore the connection between Taurellus and his teacher Jacob Schegk. Schegk maintains that both forms of material composites and vegetative and sensitive souls depend on the mixture of elements. Taurellus adopts a similar line of argument. In particular, he is clear that what arises in genuine mixture is not only a composition of simple compounds but also a simple form. This conception of the emergence of new forms is what underlies Taurellus’s analysis of the structure of plants and animals. Even if Taurellus follows the Galenic tradition in denying life to plants, he ascribes to each plant a substantial form that accounts for some of the causal properties of the organic plant body—properties that cannot be explained by the temperament of elementary qualities. Something analogous holds for plant seeds and animal seeds: They do not possess a soul but a natural form that is capable of generating plants and animals. As Taurellus argues, it is necessary to postulate the existence of such natural forms because not all kinds of attraction relevant for operation of plants and seeds can be explained by the agency of elementary heat. Thus, even plant forms and seed forms possess new causal potencies that go beyond the causal potencies of the elements that function as the matter of the emerging form.
Shaftesbury’s major work Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times was one of the most widely reprinted works in English in the eighteenth century. Historians of philosophy credit Shaftesbury for his contributions to the history of ethics. However, his contributions to debates about persons and personal identity deserve more attention.

The aims of this paper are threefold:

1. First, I will show that Shaftesbury’s criticism of a Lockean account of personal identity in terms of consciousness or memory is deeply rooted in his moral philosophy that emphasizes the importance of character development.

2. Second, I will argue that Shaftesbury is best interpreted as replacing bodily and psychological accounts of personal identity with a developmental approach to self that aims at character development and realization of one’s true self.

3. Third, I will argue that Shaftesbury deserves to be included in the reception of historical debates about personal identity, because he makes a unique contribution to the debates in the early modern period.

My contribution in the first part will go beyond Udo Thiel’s analysis. Thiel has rightly observed that Shaftesbury “rejects a crucial aspect of the Lockean idea of personal identity, according to which self-concern for the future relates or should relate to future rewards and punishments in the afterlife.”1 Shaftesbury’s disagreement with Locke’s moral views is explicit in his correspondence and I will show that the moral differences between Locke and Shaftesbury motivate Shaftesbury to criticize accounts of personal identity in terms of consciousness or memory and instead to emphasize the importance of a stable character.

In the second part, I will turn to Shaftesbury’s positive contribution to debates about persons and personal identity. Initially it may seem plausible to interpret Shaftesbury as replacing bodily and psychological views of personal identity with the proposal that a person continues to be the same over time as long as they have the same character. This certainly is a central aspect of Shaftesbury’s view, but I will argue that his approach to personal identity is not static and character does not need to be seen as fixed. Rather once we understand his approach to persons and personal identity in the context of his philosophical works as a whole, his approach is best interpreted as developmental and is an ongoing search for one’s true self that aims at character development and ultimately towards a life in harmony with the self of nature. I will show that interpreting Shaftesbury’s view as developmental is supported by the genres of his philosophical writings.

In the final part of the paper I will argue that Shaftesbury’s contribution to debates about personal identity is unique in two respects: First, his emphasis on character is important for understanding Hume’s Book 2 account of selves and predates twentieth century narrative views of personal identity. Second, it challenges traditional approaches to personal identity that aim to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity and I will end by highlighting the values of a developmental approach to self.
Bianca Bosman (University of Groningen) ‘Abelardian consequences: two notions of containment’

Abstract: In medieval theories of consequence we find several criteria for the validity or “goodness” of consequences. One of these criteria is known as the containment criterion: a consequence is valid when the consequent is contained or understood in the antecedent. The criterion was used most often in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but it existed before that as well. In fact, the criterion finds its origin in Boethius’ In Ciceronis Topica and is first used properly by Abelard in his Dialectica.

The overall aim of this paper is to gain a detailed understanding of Abelard’s use of the containment criterion. I will take a close look at the three notions which play a key role here: necessity, requirement and, of course, containment. I will first show that there are two kinds of necessity in Abelard. The broader notion reflects what is now known as necessary truth-preservation, but the stricter notion is the one which is applicable to consequences, according to Abelard. This latter notion revolves around requirement.

Whereas this notion of requirement has previously been spelled out directly in terms of containment, I will argue that it is important to keep the two apart. For, I will argue, there are in fact two notions of containment at play in Abelard, parallel to the two kinds of consequence Abelard distinguishes. His imperfect consequences rely on a notion of containment that is metaphysical and semantic in nature; this is the notion of containment as it is traditionally used for the containment criterion. For perfect consequences, however, Abelard uses another, formal notion of containment. Since the requirement criterion is applied to these perfect consequences as well, it follows that the notion of requirement cannot be equalled to the one "traditional" notion of containment. It also follows that Abelard - quite uniquely for his time - has a hybrid account of the grounding of the validity of consequences.
Anastasios Brenner (Université Paul-Valéry, Montpellier) History of Philosophy in Relation to Science: Émile Boutroux, Pierre Duhem and Gaston Milhaud

In 1909 a chair was created at the Sorbonne for Gaston Milhaud under the heading “History of Philosophy in its Relation to the Sciences”. This creation signaled the recognition of the project that Milhaud had been pursuing over the years, aiming to bring philosophy and science into closer contact. It also showed the readiness of the institution to bring about a change in orientation. This was part of a general trend at the time in favor of a scientific philosophy, a term also employed by Russell and Mach. But this endeavor took a particular route in France, that of a link with history of philosophy.

Exploring this episode further, one encounters a network of thinkers. Émile Boutroux, who supervised Milhaud’s dissertation, was intent on formulating a discourse on science from the point of view of history of philosophy. He published, as early as 1874, a celebrated book under the title On the Contingency of the Laws of Nature. Boutroux emphasized the connection between science and philosophy during Antiquity and the Renaissance. A parting of ways had come about, involving more and more fields of inquiry, from physics to biology and later to psychology and sociology. Hence a dilemma: the need to ensure the autonomy of science leads to isolate it, depriving science of its emancipatory power.

Pierre Duhem, on whom Milhaud called as well, approached the question from the opposite direction. As a working scientist, he was led from thermodynamics to the logical analysis of theory structure. But logic could not explain the evolution of theories underlying scientific progress. Duhem then turned to history of science, producing influential studies, in particular on medieval science. Thus emerged a movement of thought, and Milhaud developed a philosophical study of science directed both to the positive parts of the past doctrines and to the insights provided by scientific advances.

Now, in the light of recent developments – such as historical epistemology, history of philosophy of science, integrated philosophy and history of science – the issue of the relation between philosophy, science and history has come again to the fore. Over the past century two diametrically opposed movements have arisen: on the one hand, the attempt to establish a logic of science, purging science of any philosophical aspects, dispensing with the term philosophy altogether; on the other hand, the attempt to restrict philosophy to subjective experience, leaving aside the results of science. The question then arises whether it is possible to formulate a discourse on science that accords equal importance to both poles of human experience.

The aim of this paper, by way of a case study, is to reflect on the relation between a philosophy inclusive of its past and the sciences.
Cristina Chimisso (The Open University) Philosophy and history of science: Hélène Metzger on anachronism and mentalities

Large part of the French tradition in philosophy of science has been concerned with the integration of history of science and philosophy, and has drawn philosophical lessons from the development of the sciences. In this context, the interpretation of past texts acquires philosophical significance. The historian and philosopher Hélène Metzger (1889-1944) believed that many philosophers of science selected historical examples in order to support their philosophical ideas, and often interpreted the past in a distorted manner. In her view, Auguste Comte was the clearest example of this practice, but she also had reservations about some philosophers of her time, including Émile Meyerson and Gaston Bachelard.

In this paper, I shall focus in particular on her discussion of anachronism. Anachronism is a long-standing issue in the writing of history, and has loomed large in the historiography of the sciences. However, it is not only an issue for the historian, but also for the philosopher, as it includes epistemological, historiographical, hermeneutical and ontological questions. Metzger was an early critic of anachronism in history of science. She argued that early modern natural philosophers had different questions, aims, concepts and indeed world-views from modern scientists. In order to grasp past theories and practices, she believed that the historian should make herself a ‘contemporary’ of the scientists she studies, rather than proleptically select, or indeed misrepresent, ideas and discoveries in order to construct a progressive narrative.

Her emphasis on discontinuity explains Thomas Kuhn’s mention of her as one of his inspiration in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, and the reason why she is normally classed with the French philosophers who regard history of science as characterised by epistemological breaks, first of all Gaston Bachelard. However, I shall argue that her position on the difference between the past and present study of nature is nuanced and complex. I believe that there are two interconnected reasons for this. First, she believed that the human mind organises empirical data according to concepts that can change from one historical period to another, in line with the historicised Kantianism of Léon Brunschvicg and others. However, she also believed that old concepts may come back. Indeed, she argued that Newton’s gravitation exemplified the return of Renaissance’s ‘active analogy’, according to which bodies can act on one another without coming into contact. As a consequence, the shift in use of certain concepts does not create an unsurmountable obstacle to the understanding of past thought. Second, she thought that ‘spontaneous’ thought, similar to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s ‘primitive mentality’, is part of science, and so are the imagination and emotions. ‘Spontaneous’ thought is enduring, and create a bridge between the historian and the past texts that she reads. She also defended the role of empathy in the understanding of past texts, a choice that has led Gad Freudenthal to compare her views on interpretation with Gadamer’s hermeneutics.
According to an old and consolidate historiographical interpretation, traditional (broadly speaking) Aristotelian logic could not deal properly with relational terms and relational inferences. This is not correct.

Aristotle himself, in *Pr. An. I*, 36 and in some passages from the *Topics*, introduces (quite succinctly) a kind of non-standard syllogism including, among its terms, terms in a case other than nominative - i.e. oblique terms. *Pr. An. I*, 36 becomes a *locus classicus* in medieval discussions about relational inferences - discussion that, especially in the XIV century, is absorbed in more general theories of *consequentiae*.

Even if it is partially true that many medieval logicians struggle with obliquities and that their results are often not entirely satisfactory, there are nevertheless some very interesting and articulated medieval theories of treating this kind of oblique syllogism and oblique inferences.

I will compare John Buridan's, Albert of Saxony's and Marsilius of Inghen's analyses of oblique syllogisms and of other forms of oblique inferences in their respective treatises on *consequentiae* and in their commentaries on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics.*
What does intellectual flourishing have to do with feelings? And why should the possession of good intellectual habits be ethically important? In this paper, I will show that we are missing a rich account of how emotion and reason mutually support each other because the Peircean view of the roles affective states play in inquiry has been largely neglected. Feelings, emotions, and sentiments are at the heart of the formation of intellectual habits and to acquire good intellectual habits is to achieve logical and moral self-control at the same time.

To show this, I will first locate the different affective states that we can find in Peirce — from doubt to the logical sentiments — on a continuum between (simple) feelings and (more complex) dispositional emotions. Adopting a distinction from virtue epistemology, we can interpret the real doubt that is so important for pragmatism as a 'capacity' and states like the logical charity or hope that Peirce advocates as 'character traits'. A Peircean view of intellectual virtue thus addresses both reliabilist and responsibilist concerns in epistemology and we can see how intellectual virtues develop through the regulation of affective states as habits of feeling: Peirce’s virtuous inquirer has trained her capacity to doubt (or to admire, or to be enraged – her feelings) so that she habitually recognizes real problems and questions, and she is able to do so in part because her character traits like logical charity (or open-mindedness, or anger – her dispositional emotions) are fully developed.

But why is good reasoning of ethical importance? And why should a person flourish if she regulates her feelings in order to serve inquiry? One reason lies in the fact that affective states are essential in value recognition. While questions of value are often interpreted to constitute a realm of inquiry separate from science, I suggest that this is wrong and that, for Peirce’s virtuous inquirer, ethics is internal to inquiry and not something that must (or even could) be „applied“ to it. Finally, cultivating habits of feeling as Peircean intellectual virtues supports flourishing because of the role community plays in inquiry: emphasizing that what we feel and what we think is, eventually, not about us, and values are not something private. I will end by suggesting ways in which we might become better inquirers by habitually imagining along the lines of others.
Sophia Connell (Cambridge) and Frederique Janssen-Lauret (Manchester)  

Late 1890s Cambridge was the birthplace of analytic philosophy. Tradition has it that analytic philosophy, first developed around Frege’s polyadic logic, Moore’s realism, and Russell and Wittgenstein’s logical atomism, has always been a quintessentially male endeavour. Women, the story goes, naturally gravitate towards the normative; their absence from the early analytic canon is due to normative philosophy not being central to the original project. Our paper challenges this story. Basing our case both on published works by female philosophers and records kept by Cambridge women’s colleges, we show that several women were active researchers on logic and metaphysics during the period 1890-1950. Their publications and contributions were unfairly neglected due to sexism in Cambridge, which did not grant women degrees until 1948.

First came the logician Constance Jones (1848-1922), whose work covers a version of the sense-reference distinction, second-order quantification, and scepticism about the reduction of names to descriptions. Jones received some recognition from her contemporaries, but Russell was stingy in giving her credit; as a result her work was obscured. Jones’s professional activity was impressive: she edited the posthumous works of her teacher Sidgwick, and raised substantial funds as Mistress of the all-female Girton College. Although her commitment to furthering women’s education took time and energy away from her philosophical work, she inspired the next generation of women philosophers. Her Girton undergraduates included Susan Stebbing (1885-1943) and Dorothy Wrinch (1894-1976). Wrinch, a mathematically trained philosopher of logic and science, collaborated with Russell on logic and with Harold Jeffreys on philosophy of science, and subsequently became a theoretical biologist. Stebbing, discussed in Beaney’s and Chapman’s paper, became the UK’s first female philosophy professor. Her logic teacher had been W.E. Johnson, a famous procrastinator whose celebrated Logic owed its existence to his student, editor, and co-author Naomi Bentwich (1891-1988). Then president of the Moral Sciences club and postgraduate at Newnham College, she later founded a vegetarian primary school teaching taught Jewish refugee children, which took her away from logic. Her contemporary at Newnham was Helen Knight (1899-1984), founder of analytic aesthetics, whose ideas had considerable influence. Soon afterwards, Newnham housed several of Wittgenstein’s students. Anscombe remains the most famous of them, but the works of Margaret Macdonald and Margaret Masterman, responsible with Alice Ambrose for the publication of Wittgenstein’s lectures, deserve to be better known. Margaret Macdonald, originally Stebbing’s student and a consummate teacher, wrote on language and its intersections with aesthetics and epistemology.

Masterman, celebrated in computational linguistics for her pioneering work on machine translation, wrote on philosophy of language and science, besides founding Cambridge women’s college Lucy Cavendish, which again took time away from philosophy. We conclude the traditional story must be revised, and historical records updated, to make room for these remarkable women and their achievements in the canon of early analytic philosophy. Much further research is needed to uncover women’s contributions to the advancement of philosophy during these years, so long obscured by sexist assumptions.
Andrew Cooper (Durham) Kant's principle of natural history: toward a science of life

In this paper I aim to provide evidence for the controversial ‘Lenoir Thesis’, the claim that Kant played an important role in the development of evolutionary biology. First I assess the role of natural history in general and Blumenbach’s *Bildungstieb* in particular in the development of Kant's critical philosophy. I then examine the reception of Kant’s account of natural history in the 1790s by one of Blumenbach’s students in Göttingen, Christoph Girtanner. I argue that while Kant did not depart from a Newtonian view of matter, he provided a powerful synthesis of the contrasting views of the 19th century - Newtonian law and etiological accounts of heredity - thus providing philosophical grounds for a scientific research programme in the life sciences.
Shannon Dea (University of Waterloo) Pragmatism From Margins to Centre

In this talk, I offer moral, epistemological and pedagogical motivations for broadening the canon of classic pragmatism to include such figures as W.E.B. Du Bois, Mary Parker Follett, and Anna Julia Cooper. Starting our pedagogy and our scholarship at “the margins” in this way shows that from the start pragmatists (on a suitably broad conception of that category) have been working on issues of race, gender, social justice, etc. that are urgently relevant today.
The focus of this paper is in the use of the dialectical method in Aristotle’s practical sciences, namely politics. There is already significant scholarly work on this topic starting from the influential paper by G.E.L. Owen, ‘Tithenai ta Phainomena’ (1961). According to this approach, it seems that in a dialectical inquiry any endoxon is a potential candidate for refutation. But this does not seem to be the case in the Politics when we are talking about the acceptance or rejection of law proposals. When writing about how we should examine law proposals, one of the conditions Aristotle considers that should be met is the following: “whether it is or is not consistent with the idea and character which the lawgiver has set before his citizens. (ἕτερα δ’ εἴ τι πρῶς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπενναντιώς τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείαις)” (Politics II, 9, 1269a29-34, tr. B. Jowett). So, if we agree that Aristotle tackles matters of politics in a dialectical manner (e.g. as pointed out for instance by C.D.C. Reeve in his translation of the Politics, 1998), then it seems there are certain endoxa that should be left standing in the end while they also play a role in refuting or, better said, rejecting a proposed law. Thus, if any new law proposal is contrary or contradictory (or implies something contrary or contradictory) to any such endoxon, it should be rejected. Aristotle seems to proceed in this manner when he discusses the regimes proposed as best by others such as Plato or Hippodamus of Miletus (Politics II, 1-8). In short, for example, if we take “The harmony in the city should be preserved” as an endoxon of the mentioned sort, and a new law proposal like “All property should be common”, then the law proposal is to be rejected because it leads to social unrest.

Is this a general feature of Aristotle’s method? If yes, is there a set of propositions composed of endoxa of this type present in any inquiry? Is this along with the lines of leaving the authoritative opinions undisputed (καταλείπηται τὰ ἐνδοξα) from E.N. 1145b6-7? Are these among the theses that should not be examined (Topics I, 11, 105a3-9)? Is there a specific manner in which they can be introduced in a dialectical dispute?

Considering this problem, the plan of the paper shall be the following: 1. I will start with the presentation of what I understand by endoxon in the particular case of the Politics and what it means that an endoxon should remain ‘undisputed’ using relevant passages from the Topics (I, 10; 11; VIII, 5; 6; etc.); 2. Following this, I will present the features it should have in a refutation; 3. Then, I will consider a way to accommodate the existence of these ‘undisputable’ endoxa in a dialectical dialogue or inquiry; 4. At the end, I shall consider the question whether the existence of endoxa of this sort is possible beyond the domain of practical sciences.
In 1964 Alasdair MacIntyre gave the Riddell Memorial Lectures in the University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne. The lectures were published by OUP in 1967 under the title: *Secularization and Moral Change*. This small book contains a lot of the ideas that MacIntyre has later developed in his major works; it therefore provides a convenient focus for a comparison with the views on the same questions expressed by the Danish theologian and philosopher, K. E. Løgstrup, whose work MacIntyre has himself helped greatly to bring to the attention of English speaking philosophers.

In the lectures MacIntyre raises three questions: 1) Why has secularization not progressed any further than it has done? 2) Has the decline of religion been a, or the, cause of moral decline? 3) What effect has secularization had on English Christianity? To put it very briefly and superficially, his answer to the first question is that secularization has failed to provide a commonly agreed framework within which deep questions could be clearly formulated and answered. Christian religion therefore lives on, though in a socially impoverished form mainly relevant for the rituals of baptism, marriage and death. In answer to the second question, he argues that the decline of religion is not to be seen as the cause of, but is rather itself caused by, a decline in moral certainty and commitment which is the result of the breakdown of the relatively stable social relation of rural England brought about by the Industrial Revolution and urbanization. In answer to the third question he combines criticism of the secular, academic theories of moral philosophy prominent in the 1950s with an equally strong criticism of the religious views of contemporary protestant theologians like Dieter Bonhoeffer, Paul Tillich and John Robinson – a critique that would clearly apply to the Lutheran theologian Løgstrup also.

I shall try to show that Løgstrup could consistently follow MacIntyre in his answers to the first two questions, and also in his critique of the moral philosophy of the 1950s which Løgstrup himself attacked under the heading ‘the morality of intellectualism’. Nevertheless I shall argue also that Løgstrup’s purely secular and metaphysical moral philosophy in *The Ethical Demand* (1956) corresponds with his own theological position in a way that gives him resources both to avoid the critique MacIntyre directs against other contemporary Protestant thinkers and ultimately to question the conception of the relationship between religion and morality presupposed by MacIntyre.
Benoît Gide (ENS, Triangle) ‘Reid on common sense and our knowledge of God’

Reid is known as the Scottish common sense philosopher. A major task for readers is to determine whether or not there is a “Reidian circle” (or how to get rid of it): if the ultimate metaphysical reason we can offer to vindicate the reliability of our natural faculties is the fact the Author of our nature is an infinitely wise and benevolent agent, what is the value of this very reasoning, relying on our natural faculties as such, to establish the existence of such an Author?

Whether Reid’s epistemology can be detached (in a weak or in a strong sense) or not from his theology (De Bary, 2002), a more basic question must in any case be asked: how do we come to know, on the basis of common sense principles, that there is such a wise and benevolent Author of our nature (which may, afterwards and eventually, serve as a metaphysical guarantee of the truthfulness of our intellectual powers)? Supposing that natural evidence as such (the testimony of our faculties) is the ultimate and sufficient ground of knowledge in general, how does it lead to theism? How does it provide any knowledge of God’s existence, nature and attributes?

Some tried to identify Reid as a proto-Reformed epistemologist, maintaining that basic theological propositions are the natural and quasi-immediate effects of our natural belief-forming mechanisms (notably, Wolterstorff, 1983). This reading can be challenged for several reasons: 1) Reid does not include the belief in God’s existence among the principles of common sense, rejecting its self-evidence; 2) If we can come to know God’s existence by a simple version of the design argument (EIP, 6.6, pp. 511-512), this does not even seem to fall within the realm of what Reid calls “common understanding”, as distinct from common sense, but rather within the realm of what is already “science” (IHM 6.20, p.173); 3) God’s intellectual and moral attributes can only be known, on the one hand, by inferences grounded on the observations of the course of nature and, on the other hand, by reasoning and reflecting on the notion of necessary existence (Lectures on Natural Theology, Lect. 80th, pp. 62-63). In other words, our knowledge of God’s attributes is a matter of science, namely the highest branch of pneumatology.

Then, for Reid, and by contrast with the other Scottish common sense philosophers Oswald and Beattie, the priority of religious belief seems to vanish: for, if common sense is (or may be) the sole and sufficient ground of knowledge in general, including theology, Reid must be read 1) as considering our knowledge of God’s attributes as a hard philosophical or scientific task, and 2) as considering that even the bare knowledge of its existence as the intelligent cause of the universe requires a little more than common understanding. And whether or not theism must serve as their ultimate metaphysical ground, it seems like common knowledge and moral practice – that is ordinary human life – do not require any belief in nor knowledge of God.
Kant’s most direct engagement with Leibniz comes surprisingly late in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Only after having laid out both the sensible and conceptual elements of the cognition of objects does Kant explain that it is Leibniz’s conflation of these two elements in the analysis of cognition that leads him astray. Kant argues that because Leibniz did not distinguish objects of the senses from purely intellectual ideas he was led to argue that all distinctions between things can be conceptually distinguished, and so proclaim that the *Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles* applies to both. While Kant accepts that objects conceived apart from human perception, can be said to be distinguishable from each other merely by means of their inner determinations, objects of the senses, the appearances that for Kant constitute phenomenal nature, offer themselves as spatial determinations and so as distinguished by means of their spatial location, without the need to presuppose a distinction related to their inner constitution.\(^1\) Kant uses the example of two drops of water in a clear reference to Leibniz’s own use of this example in his correspondence with Clark, but with the opposite intent. While Leibniz uses the example to argue that all differentiation implies conceptual distinctness (the *Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernible*), that when the seemingly similar drops are placed under a microscope they will be seen to differ, Kant is arguing that, regardless of whether or not they can be so distinguished by means of their “inner determinations” (A272/B328), they are already distinguished by means of differences in their spatial locations.\(^2\) Kant does not here need to argue against Leibniz’s conception that purely intellectual objects, *noumenal* things that cannot be sensed, *can* be conceptually

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distinguished, he only needs to argue that in the sensible realm the distinctions
differentiating objects are “already given by space itself” (A264/B320) The \textit{Principle of the
Identity of Indiscernibles}, Kant concludes, does not hold for sensible objects: in the realm of
such empirical objects the sensibly distinct need not be conceptually distinguishable.

Kant, in fact, goes further, hinting that Leibniz’s conflation of the sensible and the
intellectual has not only misrepresented the sensible by overlooking the spatial
determination that is not conceptually explicable, but so too, in such a conflation,
metaphysical ideas have been assumed to be not only discernible, but also fully explicable;
the \textit{Principle of Sufficient Reason} has been paired by Leibniz with the \textit{Principle of the Identity of
Indiscernibles}.\footnote{Leibniz, \textit{The Leibniz-Clark Correspondence}, Fifth Paper, Section 21, pp. 61.}
Recent years have seen a huge volume of highly sophisticated work on Kant’s philosophy of education. These studies have largely focused on two lines of inquiry. First, what are the implications of Kant’s views on pedagogy for his moral psychology – for example, for his theories of character or virtue? (Prominent instances include Munzel 1999 and Herman 2007). Second, how exactly does Kant understand the educative process? In this context, recent papers have addressed the central role of ‘ethical gymnastics’ (Surprenant 2010), of imitation [Nachfolge] (Merritt 2011) and of feelings such as the love of honour (Cohen 2015). Whilst drawing on this broad background, my aim in the present paper is to approach Kant’s theory of education from a new angle: that of its limits. Crudely, what is it that Kant thinks cannot be taught and why?

Across Kant’s writings, he identifies a number of important capacities that he takes to either partially or fully resist education. I will discuss two in particular. The first is ‘the power of judgment...of determining whether something stands under a given rule’ (KrV:A132/B171; cf Anth.:198-9). This, Kant informs us, ‘cannot be taught but only practiced’; it is thus related to ‘so-called mother-wit, the lack of which cannot be made good by any school’ (KrV:A133/B172). The second is the capacity, identified with artistic genius in KU, to ‘discover ideas for a given concept’, something ‘that cannot be learned by any diligence’ (KU:317). Kant develops this in large part through a comparison structured around the possibility of pedagogy: it is explicated by contrast with ‘processing this material and giving it form’, something that does ‘require a talent that is academically trained’ (KU:310). To understand this contrast, I argue, we need to look not so much to the third Critique as to On Pedagogy.

Having introduced these cases, I argue that their juxtaposition raises a number of important questions. First, how firm are the limits which Kant imposes on pedagogy? For example, how exactly should we understand the idea of judgment being open to practice, and thus presumably refinement, and yet not to teaching? Second, how should an ideal Kantian teacher frame his or her instruction given that key factors in the pupil’s development lie outside the scope of their intervention? Third, does Kant have a unified conception of what it is that makes something unteachable or are there irreducibly different factors responsible? For example, might we need a distinct analysis for cases of unteachability in the theoretical and practical spheres?
The very title of Alasdair MacIntyre’s *Dependent Rational Animals* beautifully captures the ambivalence of the human condition. We are animals, so constitutively tied to our evolutionary and biological history. Yet we are rational, so capable of many activities of reflection that philosophers including Thomists like MacIntyre and Lutherans like Løgstrup have wanted (rightly) to see as expressive both of transcendence and of autonomy. Yet, again, we are dependent: we are incomplete without each other, and we are helpless without the minimal dowry of good fortune that we all need to be secured, at least for some of our short lives, against the often harsh and arbitrary ways of the world we live in.

The notion that human agency is constitutively, and drastically, immersed in the background of human passivity from which it emerges is an old one. One key text in the history of this notion is the Phaedrus, Plato’s great meditation on the power of love, on the folly of attempting to deal with it on merely rationalistic terms, and on our near-helplessness in face of that power. I shall explore some of the consequences of taking seriously what the Phaedrus teaches us about human contingency and “thrown-ness” for philosophers who want to think about vulnerability and trust in particular.

In his article ‘Human Nature and Human Dependence: What Might a Thomist Learn from Reading Løgstrup?’, MacIntyre reflects upon Logstrup’s ethical philosophy, and on the interactions with it that are possible for a Thomist. My paper offers a reflection on MacIntyre’s reflection. In particular I stress the possibility of reworking Logstrup’s notion of the radical and unfulfillable ethical demand upon the moral agent as a notion of permanently inevitable vulnerability *in the moral patient*. If we see each other rightly then one ethically key thing that we see is each other’s vulnerability; and the right response to that vision is a humane pity, what Aquinas and Augustine—and MacIntyre following them—would want to call misericordia or mercy. My proposal is that mercy in this sense—we could also call it pity—is (pace Nietzsche) one of the three great forces for good in the human heart. (The other two are love and the urge to create.) And this, it seems to me, is the real ground of Logstrup’s notion of the radical demand.
Douglas Hedley (Cambridge): Ralph Cudworth and the Problem of Ancient Theology’.

One of the more perplexing aspects of Cudworth’s *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* 1678 is the long and elaborate defence of a primordial monotheism. The extensive learning adduced by Cudworth can obscure the philosophical dimension of his proposal. In my paper I offer an account of the metaphysical core of Cudworth’s theory, and its relation to the corresponding stances of both Hobbes and Spinoza.
Christian Hengsterman (Cambridge): ‘The Cambridge Platonists in Debate’

Presents an overview of the philosophical debates involving the Cambridge Platonists which figure in the AHRC-funded research project ‘The Cambridge Platonists at the Origins of Enlightenment’.
Whereas Dewey’s pragmatism is often thought of as antithetical to Peirce’s, their respective positions on the reality of general kinds are arguably closer than is widely appreciated. According to Peirce, pragmatism entails a commitment to scholastic realism, and he was therefore led to disown most of his self-described ‘pragmatist’ contemporaries because of tendencies in their thought which he regarded as nominalistic. Peirce was particularly critical of Dewey, whose naturalistic logic he considered incompatible with the reality of logical form and whose commitment to the view that knowledge makes a real difference to its object he regarded as inconsistent with realism about the phenomena of scientific discovery, including general laws and kinds.

In *Experience and Nature*, however, Dewey explicitly distances himself from nominalism and advocates a position according to which general meanings are real natural phenomena. For Dewey, meaning is that phenomenon which covers the scope of those natural relations supportive of an organism’s response to features of its environment as having the significance of instrumental means to the realisation of practical outcomes. Moreover, Dewey maintains, phenomena are themselves constitutively determined by their instrumental functions in a situation centring upon an organism’s practical transactions with its environment. As such, according to Dewey, one’s surroundings are themselves determined by those natural developments as a result of which they have become endowed with significance as instrumental means towards the realisation of certain practical ends. Hence, Dewey claims, general meanings do not reside purely in the use of conventional signs for otherwise private mental states. Instead, meaning is located throughout the functional relations by which an organism is practically situated within its environment. For Dewey, meanings are non-subjective in so far as they map real possibilities for human practical agency which have developed naturally during an on-going process of adaptation and adjustment to our environment. Meanings are also general according to Dewey, because the reality of the functional relationships in which they consist is not that of an individual phenomenon but rather that of a community of practically related phenomena.

Despite his rejection of nominalism, however, Peirceans might object that Dewey’s position affords too great an object-constitutive function to human purposes and practices for it to count as a genuine form of realism. Since, according to Peirce, conventionally established patterns of interaction with one’s environment do not amount to real generalities, his supporters are therefore likely to object that Dewey overstates the extent to which his position is consistent with the reality of general kinds. Nonetheless, one may reply on Dewey’s behalf that he rejects the very subject-object distinction which is assumed in the aforementioned Peircean dismissal of his position as a species of nominalism. Contrary to what the Peircean alleges, Dewey does not contend that the reality of general kinds is ultimately conditional upon subjective factors, because he presents subject and object as organically integrated elements of a comprehensive functional system. This paper will outline Dewey’s case against nominalism and argue that his position concerning the reality of general kinds is not nominalistic.
Sarah Hutton (York): ‘Ethics and Self-Determination in Henry More’

Henry More’s moral philosophy has been overlooked by historians of philosophy, despite the fact that his *Enchiridion ethicum* (1668) was relatively widely read in More’s time. More’s ethics focuses on the practical aspect of living virtuously by elaborating a moral psychology key elements of which are a theory of the passions, his concept of free will and his notion of the ‘boniform faculty’. I show how he employs a synthesis of Stoicism, Platonism, Cartesianism to develop his conception free will as self-determination, the power and inclination to act virtuously.
According to John of Salisbury, the 12th century philosopher William of Soissons “invented a machine for the purpose of subduing by force the old established principles of logic, for constructing unbelievable consequences and destroying the theories of the ancients.” Martin has argued that the ‘machine’ developed by Soisson was an argument used to demonstrate the principle of *ex impossibile quodlibet*: that from a contradiction, anything follows. This argument raised problems for later logical theories, in particular those of Peter Abelard and Robert Kilwardby, who were committed to a number of connexive principles about implication which are not compatible with *ex impossibile quodlibet*. This required those thinkers committed to connexive implication to offer a defense against Soissons. One such answer is offered by Peter of Spain. In the fifth chapter of the *Syncategoremata*, Peter of Spain discusses consequences involving the term ‘si’ and, in the final section of this chapter, presents a rather puzzling argument in an attempt to refute arguments like Soissons’ for *ex impossibile quodlibet*. In this paper we will set up the debate between these two figures, and offer a cogent interpretation of some of the puzzling parts of Peter’s arguments against *ex impossibile quodlibet*. 
Liba Kaucky (Independent Scholar) - Lady Mary Shepard on the Afterlife

In this paper, I would like to examine the under-researched philosopher, Lady Mary Shepherd (1777-1847), who in her day was, nevertheless, influential within Edinburgh Philosophy debates and commented on famous philosophers including Locke, Reid, Hume and Berkeley. I shall build on and attempt to further Martha Bolton’s view of Shepherd as a ‘sceptical realist’, especially in relation to Shepherd’s arguments about perceptual knowledge, as discussed in Bolton’s paper which she presented at the British Society for the History of Philosophy conference “Causation 1500-2000 (25th-27th March 2008) titled “Causality, Physical and Mathematical Induction: the necessitarian and “skeptical” theory of Lady Mary Shepherd”.

In my paper, I shall comb through and examine Lady Mary Shepherd’s exploration of the possibility of an afterlife in her book “Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects” (hereafter cited as EPEU and Essay X, published 1827 but possibly written much earlier) because, as far as I am aware, there has been no specific research to date on her view of the afterlife. I find that in this topic, she particularly reveals how her concept of God and religion guides and provides a foundation for her philosophical views and inspires her to refine the accepted philosophical arguments of her era. My stance shall be that Shepherd finds religion, God and her Christianity a good starting point and a source of inspiration that guides and underpins her philosophy. I shall support this view by evaluating some sections of pertinent textual evidence in her EPEU and Essay X (1827). I shall try to clarify Shepherd’s arguments by focusing on and unpacking her analogies (EPEU 1827), such as the compass and the worm on a leaf, which shed light on her abstract, theoretical approach to the afterlife. I think Shepherd adopts this approach because she is arguing that concepts of God, the soul and the afterlife are beyond one’s sensory and perceptual experience but are within one’s rational capacity to reason through. I shall combine my view of Shepherd as a thorough-going Rationalist with Bolton’s (2008) view of her as a ‘sceptical realist’. Moreover, as one can see in both Shepherd’s EPEU and Essay X (1827), she shows that, just as in her example of the compass guiding the ship north, the devout mind can grasp the idea of God and an afterlife and believe these ideas to be true, despite the fact that details about God and the afterlife are beyond our human intellect and certainly beyond our sensory and perceptual experience.
This paper explores how the professionalization of history as an empirical discipline contributed to the emergence of historical relativism, focusing on the theoretical reflections of the historians Leopold von Ranke and Johann Gustav Droysen.

The paper starts from the observation that the most pressing problem for early nineteenth century historians was not relativism but “particularism”. Historiography had asserted its autonomy from philosophy by rejecting abstract, aprioristic speculation. But the rejection of abstractions raised the challenge as to how the historian could go beyond knowledge of isolated empirical facts, i.e. how “Universalgeschichte” was possible. This problem was also highlighted in Hegel’s and Leo’s criticisms of Ranke’s historiography.

Ranke answered to this challenge by pursuing a methodological double-strategy. On the one hand, the historian should be impartial and attend to all phenomena with the same attentiveness and precision. On the other hand, he should seek out connections such as to reveal the meaningful totalities or “individualities” that structure the historical world. This methodology entails relativist themes. Impartiality leads Ranke to reject historical progress, “individualism” to view all historical epochs as having a value in themselves.

But impartiality and individualism are not just methodological guidelines for Ranke. Rather, they are ethical imperatives. The ultimate task of the historian is to illuminate the meaning of human history as God’s creation. To achieve this, the historian has to emulate – although he can never reach – God’s perspective. Hence, the relativist strand in Ranke’s thinking is balanced by the conviction that human history is inherently meaningful and can be shown to be so by historians who follow the “ethos” of impartiality.

According to Droysen, the problem of particularism cannot be solved by impartiality. Meaningful connections can only be revealed on the basis of prior decisions about what is essential in history. And these decisions are necessarily subjective. Therefore, the historian can only reach a “relative truth” that is shaped by his partial perspective. Droysen’s account of historical knowledge has relativist leanings.

But like Ranke’s methodology, Droysen’s epistemology of history involves an “ethos” of the historian. For Droysen, subjective partiality is not just epistemically unavoidable but ethically required. He sees history as a process of human self-creation. In this process, human beings express eternal ideas in changing and progressively ever more elaborate forms. Being a creative and historical being himself, the historian is called upon to foster progress. To this end, he has to give a partial historical reconstruction that serves the political goals of the nation state. The relativist themes in Droysen’s epistemology are thus alleviated by the conviction that history is a meaningful process and that the historian’s subjectivity allows him to take part in this process.

I conclude that the professionalization of history did not lead to the emergence of relativism directly. In answering to the problem of particularism, historians developed metaphysical ideas about the meaningfulness of human history and an “ethos” of the historian that also kept them from fully acknowledging the relativist themes that surfaced in their own thinking.
Alexander Klein (California State University, Long Beach). ‘Emotion and the Web of Belief: James and Quine’

What is W. V. O. Quine’s relationship to classical pragmatism? Although he resists the comparison to William James in particular, commentators have seen an affinity between his “web of belief” model of theory confirmation and James’s claim that our beliefs form a “stock” that faces new experience as a corporate body. I argue that the similarity is only superficial. James thinks that as a psychological matter of fact, emotion must be part of the web because it plays a key role in elevating mere conception or appearance into full-blooded belief. One aim of the present paper is to show how this process works. Although he does not think an ultimate evaluation of evidence for a belief should make reference to emotional appeal, he thinks an epistemology of discovery must take seriously the role of emotion in cognition. In contrast, Quine insists on modelling our scientific commitments as a web of purely cognitive mental states, and I argue that this reflects a tacit holdover of one of logical positivism’s crucially anti-pragmatist commitments—that philosophy of science should focus exclusively on the context of justification, not the context of discovery. To be sure, Quine’s naturalism involves replacing the (Carnapian) logic of science with a psychology of science—but I argue that Quine’s is a psychology of justification exclusively. James’s emphasis on the role of emotion reminds us that for him, epistemology is chiefly aimed at extracting lessons that stand to improve our actual practice of inquiry. This emphasis on discovery as a (perhaps the) crucial locus for epistemological inquiry is characteristic of pragmatism in general. Since Quinean epistemology is always an epistemology of justification, he is not happily viewed as a member of the pragmatist tradition.
Stephanie Koerner (University of Liverpool) Seeing Anew in Wittgenstein and Bruegel, the Elder: fresh perspectives in the history of philosophy on the arts

Ludwig Wittgenstein ended *The Tractatus* (1922) with the very brief section 7: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." Few aspects of his *Philosophical Investigations* (1958: 212) are more striking indices of deep and far reaching change in his perspectives than his remark, We find certain things about seeing puzzling because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough"; and his discussions of "aesthetic experience," "aspect perception and aspect blindness," and "seeing anew." During the period when Wittgenstein was working on these ideas he expressed concerns that "People nowadays think scientists are there to instruct them, poets, and musicians etc. to entertain them. That the latter have something to teach them; that never occurs to them" (*Culture and Value* (1998: 42)

This paper argues that the time may be right for addressing manifestations of this problem in the history of philosophy. The paper illustrates this argument along several lines. The most central is an exploration of expressions of the ideas - aesthetic experience, aspect perception and aspect blindness, and seeing anew - in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951) and of Pieter Bruegel, the Elder (1525 -1561). My approach brings insights drawn from two areas of specialisation together:

- strongly historical approaches to revisiting key themes in Wittgenstein in lights of his unpublished Nachlaß and collections of lectures and conversations, which variously challenge a-historical polemic over so called 'early' and 'late Wittgenstein' (e.g. Day and Krebs 2010);
- micro-historical research on Bruegel and Renaissance (or early modern) art, more broadly, which goes against the grain of polemic characterisations of Bruegel as either "primitive" (as in the expression, "Peasant Bruegel") or as a supposedly erudite "modern".

Exploring Wittgenstein and Bruegel from perspectives these insights offer makes it possible to illustrate this paper's key argument further by examining:

- contributions that recent innovations in art history can make to addressing the impacts on the history of philosophy of several outstanding difficulties in the history and philosophy of science (e.g., Galison 2008);
- the history of philosophy’s special advantages for addressing one of the key challenges these difficulties pose, namely: balancing the huge amount of attention that been devoted to rethinking problematic generalisations about science (and art/sci studies) (e.g. Henderson 2007), with rethinking equally problematic "disenchantment" models of art history (e.g. Wood 2007);
- the possibility that philosophical innovations (centring on connotations of aesthetic experience, aspect perception and blindness, and seeing anew) in the arts may have taken place earlier than - or at least coeval with - deep change in the dynamics of philosophy and science;
- what the above suggest about prospects for addressing Wittgenstein's concerns about the arts, and/or arguments for taking the philosophical significance of the arts and of science equally seriously (e.g., Biagre 1996; Jones and Galison 1998).
Nakul Krishna (Cambridge) Case Studies in Analytic Style: Iris Murdoch and Elizabeth Anscombe

In the mid-twentieth century, the idea that analytic philosophy was characterised principally by a distinctive research programme – that of conceptual analysis – suffered a slow decline in Britain. This decline was explained by a number of factors: challenges to the analytic-synthetic distinction, the revival of a form of realism that did not take concepts to be the subject matter of philosophy, the running aground of the ordinary language tradition of Austin, and the re-emergence of substantive ethical and political theory in the work of John Rawls and others. Analytic philosophy in the early part of this transition began to be characterised instead by a style of thought, writing and conversation. More precisely, it was characterised by a range of styles, which, while all readily distinguishable from the styles of philosophical writing, thought and conversation then popular in France and Germany, were not identical. Some of the styles most commonly associated with the orthodoxy period were those of Gilbert Ryle, mannered and marked by long lists of adverbs, and that of JL Austin, arch and enlivened by odd metaphors and almost surreal examples.

With these stylistic exemplars regnant at Oxford, the work of Iris Murdoch and Elizabeth Anscombe in the 1950s showed resourcefulness and not a little courage. Murdoch and Anscombe had evolved their styles of thought and writing in the course of their wartime engagement with the writings and utterances of, respectively, Sartre and Wittgenstein. Moreover, both had a serious interest in theology not shared by their male colleagues at Oxford; Murdoch admired Simone Weil's mystical writings and Anscombe had converted to Roman Catholicism in her late teens. Perhaps in consequence, the writings they produced in the 1950s showed an imaginativeness that was never merely glib or clever, and yet, a seriousness of purpose that did not devolve into portentousness or pomposity. I shall try, in this essay, to show with examples how Murdoch and Anscombe's early writings show an attempt both to use and to subvert the regnant styles of philosophical writing in the British tradition: in the kinds of illustrative examples they devised, in the unusual structures of their books and essays, and in the use to which they put wit and irony in their polemics against the moral philosophy of their contemporaries.
Robert Lane (University of West Georgia) - ‘Peirce’s Basic Realism and Basic Idealism’

“[W]e may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be”. This was Charles Peirce’s preferred definition of “real”—something is real exactly when it has the properties it has, whether or not anyone believes that it has them or otherwise represents it as having them. Peirce held there to be real things, and thus he believed in a real world, a world that is the way it is regardless of whether you, or I, or anyone else, believes that it is that way. I call Peirce’s view that there is a real world his basic realism. Peirce distinguished between that which is independent of what anyone thinks about it—the real—and that which is independent of what anyone thinks about anything at all. The latter is the external, that which is external to the mind (i.e., not within my mind or your mind or anyone else’s mind) and so “is what it is, whatever our thoughts may be on any subject”. Given these definitions, anything external is ipso facto real, since anything which is independent of what anyone thinks is also independent of what anyone thinks about it. There is plentiful evidence throughout Peirce’s work that he believed both basic realism and realism about external things.

Peirce also defended a set of views that he labeled “idealism” and described as “idealistic”. Here I do not mean what he called his objective idealism—a form of metaphysical monism that he defended in his 1890s cosmological papers according to which “matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws”. Instead I have in mind a kind of idealism that is present in his thought beginning no later than the late 1860s and lasting well into the 1900s. He was referring to this other sort of idealism when he described himself as accepting an “idealistic theory of reality”, “an idealistic doctrine concerning truth”, an “[i]dealistic theory of metaphysics”, and “conditional idealism”. It is reasonable to wonder whether this other idealism is compatible with his basic realism and his realism about the external, not only because of the historical
opposition between “realism” and “idealism”, but also because some doctrines labeled “idealism” involve the claim that everything that there is, is mental, and therefore, on Peirce’s use of the word, not external.

The goal of this paper is to explain exactly what this other sort of idealism—which I call basic idealism—amounts to. I will argue that Peirce’s basic idealism is the view that anything real is a possible object of cognition and that basic idealism is thus implied by his pragmatic clarification of the idea of reality, according to which the real is what is represented in a true belief. I will then argue that Peirce’s basic idealism is compatible with both his basic realism and his realism about the external world.
Jacques-Louis Lantoine ‘Is the common sense ignorant? Spinoza and the vulgar’s knowledge of God’

It seems obvious that Spinoza’s philosophy doesn’t set a great value to common sense’s judgements. The status of the first kind of knowledge condemns as inadequate most of the ideas assumed as truths by common people. Spinoza is so aware of the strength of prejudices commonly assumed that he anticipates, at the end of the first part of Ethics, that the true knowledge of God will be hindered by the “common supposition that all natural things act, as men do, on account of an end. Indeed, people maintain as a certainty that God directs all things to some definite end” (E I app.). In a way, most of “people”, including atheists, theologians and philosophers, are delirious about God: the vulgar is ignorant and superstitious.

However, it is after he exposed the true knowledge of God that he considers the prejudice which could be an “obstacle for the understanding” (E I app.) of what is, in fact, absolutely clear, since absolutely true. The problem is not ignorance, but prejudice that impede the mind in his effort to think rationally. Moreover, as Spinoza puts it, “Each idea of each body, or of each particular thing that actually exists, necessarily involves an eternal and infinite essence of God” (E II 45), and “Any human mind has an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence” (E II 47). Everyone has, quite spontaneously, an adequate knowledge of God, and everybody has common notions, which are common to all people because they are common properties of things. Thus, a strange spinozist common sense rises, a common sense that conflicts with another common sense.

If “He who has a true idea at the same time knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing” (E II 43), how could we explain that the vulgar is so ignorant and so reluctant to the truth he already knows? The Ethics doesn’t aim to give him the truth about what he ignores, but to explain why he who strives to persevere in his being as far as he can, which includes the effort of thinking by the laws of his own nature, thinks so stupidly about God. The effort for thinking truly is impeded by ideas of the imagination. The power of thinking is lessened, because of other ideas. As everyone knows that the whole is greater than the part, even the sceptic, everyone actually knows the truth about God. Nevertheless, most of people, atheist or religious, philosophers of the common sense or Cartesians, ignores the true nature of God. In another words, the mind may have an idea that is not known by the mind. That is why the Ethics aims to liberate or emancipate the common effort of the mind – and of the body – to act from its own laws, effort which is always plainly actual, never diminished, but always hindered by obstacles, namely, passions, imaginative ideas and prejudices of the common sense.
David Leech (Bristol) ‘Cudworth on Divine Love’.

This paper responds to Stephen Darwall’s observation that although for Cudworth the fundamental ethical motive is love, he tells us little about love’s character, aim and object. Cudworth’s doctrine of spiritual love or ‘supraintellectual instinct’ as a natural inclination to the good as it takes shape in two of his unpublished freewill manuscripts. I show that he assumes a three-fold model of how spiritual love as a natural grace fits into the overall moral life of a person.
Stumpf writes of Kant’s account of necessity that ‘in this lies his true historical merit in the theoretical realm’. High praise indeed! Especially given his vehement objections to and distaste for many other aspects of Kant’s philosophy. Why does Stumpf praise Kant, and is it deserved? I will outline Stumpf’s remarks on necessity from section IV of ‘Psychology and Epistemology’, and assess to what extent, given his views, he was right to see an ally in Kant.

Stumpf makes a number of claims about necessity. One, there is genuine objective natural necessity, not merely subjective necessity. In this, he sees himself as agreeing with Kant against Hume’s account of the origin of the concept of causation in terms of habits of the mind. Two, he claims that necessity is a property of judgment contents, not of mental processes. Hence, we can acquire a concept of necessity from attending to certain contents, rather than from the necessity of certain mental processes taking place. Third, he argues that we don’t need a concept of necessity in order to judge contents that are necessary – only to judge that they are necessary – hence, it is open to us to explain the origin of the concept of necessity as being acquired through abstraction from acquaintance with necessary contents. Four, he suggests that natural necessity would be logical necessity for an understanding greater than ours, that was able to grasp the essences of things. Five, he praises Kant for ‘marshalling all his intellectual power’ to retain a true necessity in nature as well as in logic.

How do these views relate to Kant? I will argue that Kant does defend a notion of necessity that is objective, not subjective, but in a very different way to Stumpf. Kant defends a necessity of things, a concept of necessity that can feature in the content of judgments, but he also introduces a sense of logical necessity of judgments that does not concern or contribute to the content that is judged, contra Stumpf. Moreover, there is reason to think that Kant takes this to be the more basic notion. One can understand this more basic notion as contributing to an explanation of how necessity enters into the contents of judgments and experiences at all, such that it is then present for Stumpf to abstract out again. Stumpf’s alternative way of thinking about how necessity enters the content of a judgment seems to be in analogy with logical necessity – if only our minds were good enough, the necessary connection of things in nature would appear to us as just like the necessary connection of concepts in an analytic judgment. But this kind of view is in stark opposition to Kant. Kant expressly sought to move away from a
rationalist view that effectively took natural necessity to be a kind of logical necessity. Hence, whilst Stumpf is welcome to praise Kant for defending ‘true necessity’, there remains very little else in common between the views of the two philosophers.
Peirce’s pragmatist account of truth is teleological and as such it is – in terminology familiar today – neither ‘robustly ontological’ nor ‘merely semantic’. What we mean by a truth-claim, Peirce suggests, is that we expect both ourselves and future inquirers to behave in a certain way. This view has been acknowledged as a form of ‘internal realism’ and under these lights subjected to strenuous argument over whether this is ‘realist enough’ (e.g. Horwich, *Truth* (1998), Wright, *Truth and Objectivity* (1992)). What is less often recognized is the way in which Peirce’s claim emerges from a thorough reconceiving of epistemology whereby ‘the idea idea’ is replaced as the fundamental building block of mental life by habit. What is really interesting about this from the point of view of the normative sciences (of which epistemology is newly being recognized as one in interesting developments such as virtue epistemology) is that the study of ideals such as truth, is no longer separable in principle from their development. Some consequences of this are explored for studying (and developing) intellectual virtues in their lived context, in particular the modern University. For instance, what profits a philosopher to publish many papers on truth while neglecting to play a part in building the community of inquiry in matters such as refereeing, reading and citing others’ research contributions, and training and encouraging the young? How might we communally exercise greater self-control to avoid spending our resources on activities that contribute little to our shared ideal of making our ideas clear and then, wherever possible, true?
Dewey was at first a kind of Hegelian. He gives also some lectures on the Hegelian philosophy of spirit. In this lectures, he presents Hegel as “great actualist”, someone who cares for what actually succeed in getting outward form and who violently criticizes the opinion and sentiment which fail in connecting themselves with the objective world.

The way Dewey presents the Hegelian notion of spirit is very interesting. He clearly shows how spirit makes the nature something, which is formed and fixed by its own activity. According to Dewey, Hegelian spirit „transmutes all things into tools for its own action“.

By analysing carefully the lectures that Dewey devotes on Hegel, it becomes clear that the idea of instrumentalism, which Dewey developed later takes its first formulation in the reception of the philosophy of Hegel. This reception is in a great part indebted to Caird and to Wallace’s translation of Hegel’s encyclopedical logic and Hegel’s philosophy of the spirit. In particular, these Scottish Idealists emphasize the concrete dimension of Hegel at the expense of the metaphysical interpretations of Hegel by anti-Hegelians like Trendelenburg.

Hegel’s rehabilitation in the pragmatic field of philosophy has also a long history. But our aim is not only to contribute to a better understanding of some transitions in the history of philosophy, it is also to understand the tenet of Dewey’s thinking as regards the meaning of philosophy and its relation to history.

When at the end of its life Dewey speaks of a „permanent legacy“ of Hegel in its philosophy, it has to be taken seriously. That is why we would like to shed light on Dewey’s instrumentalism by a comparison with Hegel’s logic of actuality (Wirklichkeit) and its objective aspects in the philosophy of spirit.

Our thesis is that Dewey’s idea of instrumentalism is linked to its conception of presentism by an implicit logic. This implicit logic is not a deontological one, but an alethic one. It considers the possibility, the contingency and the necessity not as abstract categories, which would be fixed and opposed the one to the others, but as the moments of the free realization of action. The way according to which Hegel understands the relation of the possible to the actuality in his Science of Logic (more accurately in the end of the doctrine of essence) is a revolutionary one. The real is no more to be found in the possible, it is rather the possible, which is to be found in the real. The reality is no more to be opposed to the ideal, it has to be understand as the means of the realisation of ourselves. That is why the salvation is not in the nostalgia of a past or in the dream of a better future, but in a concrete understanding of what it is. On this point, the logic of Hegel seems very fruitful to enlighten what is at stake in Dewey’s pragmatism. More precisely, it makes explicit the modal logic, which stays behind every free action.
In *Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung* (1873), Stumpf argues against his erstwhile supervisor Herman Lotze’s supposition that the sensible matter of experience is formless. The ‘Psychology and Epistemology’ lecture takes up this theme. The Kantian distinction between matter and form is, Stumpf rails, “psychologically completely indefensible” (Leech and Textor trans., p.10). What’s more, geometry is concerned with space as a conscious presentation. But if the possibility of geometry is to be explained, it must be allowed that space figures as part of the content of consciousness and not merely as its form. Call this *Stumpf’s Charge*. Part of Stumpf’s rebuke of the matter/form distinction is familiar – one cannot see colour without seeing extent. But if this is right then Lotze’s supposition that colour patches are extensionless is descriptively inadequate, and likewise Kant’s supposition that “one could abstract away from the presentation of a body everything that belongs to sensa- tion, hardness, colour, and nevertheless could retain extension and figure as remaining” (Leech and Textor trans., p. 11).

Husserl, Stumpf’s student, describes his teacher’s as well as Lotze’s contributions to the question of space perception as “masterful” (Husserl 1893, 293). In this paper I take up some scattered Husserlian reflections on space so as to evaluate *Stumpf’s Charge*. My analysis has three parts:

First, I sort among ways in which the contents of experience may be foundationally phenomenally related, as colour and extent are – one cannot see one without the other. Both are co-seen, an idiom I borrow from Husserl (1907).

Second, I note an asymmetry that Stumpf does not explicitly observe and which goes some way to addressing his *Charge*. The relatedness that holds between colour and extent pertains only to what the Husserl of the third *Logical Investigation* calls ‘moments’, dependent parts of a thing as a whole. But this being so, while there is a symmetrical relation between colour and extent when dependent parts of the visible surface of an object, this need not yet apply to colour and extension - here extension is understood as a property of three-dimensional, voluminous space, while extent is a property of lines and areas, which do not have extension. Phenomenologically this seems apposite (and tallies, if obliquely, with Kant’s contention above): empty regions can be seen. Nonetheless, as I go on to argue, it remains the case that there is a kind of co-seeing in the case of seeing empty regions. Empty regions are seen only if they are seen through – one sees them in virtue of
seeing opaque (coloured) objects through them.

Third, I explain why, if this is right, we can go some way to honouring Stumpf’s insight concerning both co-seeing and what must be so if geometry is to be possible, while also redressing his Charge: the distinction is not psychologically completely indefensible after all. I further reify this claim by drawing a distinction, which Stumpf does not make, between the form visual of experience and its structure.
Developing upon Menn (2002) and Landry (2012), I will argue that the process of Recollection and the Method of Hypothesis begin in the middle of the Meno’s slave boy example at 84a. I agree with both these writers’ independently reached conclusion that the Meno proposes Recollection primarily as a way of providing the known premise for inferring a known conclusion concerning a thing’s qualities. We also agree that the Meno deliberately depicts Recollection as following a purifying elenchus. But I disagree with their conclusion that the Meno leaves out, as peripheral to the dialogue’s purpose, explaining how Recollection works. I argue that the answer to this in Phaedo’s Recollection argument is seminally present in the slave boy discussion.

My main piece of evidence for this is the seminal presence in both recollection arguments of observing the “compresence of opposite” qualities. Soon after these passages Plato explicitly sees such observation as “summoning” the mind to recognize the simple object which is similar to the quality – namely the “Form”. My second piece of evidence is the role of Recollection in getting the Method of Hypothesis going in both the Slave Boy and the Deuteros Plous. Landry has shown that the “shift in method” beyond the Elenchus, at 84a, is “from arithmetical considerations to geometrical … qualities”. Socrates says “if you don’t want to use numbers at least point to the line”, and then the diagonal. Axioms for inferring to geometrical objects are more complex than for numbers as Euclid would soon make very clear. It is the “truth of such ta onta” (86b1) which has been “awoken by questioning” (a8). Kahn (1996) points out that the Phaedo’s Recollection argument has the same “necessary” ta onta result concerning Forms (76d6-e4). This “worthy” (92d7), “robust” (100a6, b6) result has come from reflection upon the equality and inequality of sticks. And this seems extremely like the discernment of Forms in the Phaedo’s Final Argument, as well as the Republic’s “diagonal itself” (510d9) and other “opposites” (523b-524e) which “summon the mind” towards Forms (522c-e) through dianoia. So Socrates’ much more constructive use of diagrams after 84a, compared to the previous elenchus, is what enables the Slave Boy to recollect. It is very similar to what he does for Simmias in the Phaedo’s explicit (72e1, 73a5) development of the argument (74b).

My second piece of evidence flows from the fact that Menn has shown how the Meno is introducing an analogue of geometric reduction of a problem or hypothesis to a self-evident first principle. This it seems to be what is happening after Meno 84a. The first principle is the recollected “diagonal”. But in the first stage of the Phaedo’s Deuteros Plous reduces the problem of finding a cause of generation and corruption to the “robust hypothesis” “Forms exists”, and then infers back from that first principle. And this “Forms exists” is the “supposed (thamen pou)” (74a9) “necessitated” (76e5), “robust” (100a6, b6) and “worthy hypothesis” (92d7). Such reductive recollection of a first principle upon which inference takes place is justifiably termed aitias logismos (Meno 98a4).
Elisa Magri (UCD) – ‘Habituality and Normativity: Towards a Revision of Naturalism’

My paper is specifically concerned with the concepts of habit and second nature in Hegel’s philosophy. As is well known, Hegel is the philosopher that has given considerable attention to the problem of habituality. To be sure, in the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* and in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel argues that habituality represents a second nature in that it grounds the transition from nature to spirit. Importantly, in the PR, Hegel links habit to the notion of ethical life, arguing that lasting dispositions are essential to actualise morality. Thus, Hegel arguably proposes a theory of habituality that is anchored in anthropology without doing away with agency. With regard to this, the so-called Hegel Renaissance in the US has given rise to a renewed interest in Hegel’s theory of second nature, most notably in relation to naturalism. In this paper, I shall assess the different philosophical options provided by the naturalism debate (e.g. McDowell, Pinkard, Pippin, McCumber, Testa, Lumsden). However, as I shall argue, most of these debates have focused on the normative status of habituality (e.g. in what sense nature counts as normative or spiritual, or - vice versa – in what sense do social practices and behaviours count as natural), thereby overlooking the problem of habit reversal.

By critically examining the problem of habit in both Hegel’s *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* and the *Philosophy of Right*, I will inquire to what extent the norms of social life presuppose habituality as their natural ground. I shall argue that habituality can be conceived of in two different senses, and that the kind of habit at stake in ethical life is not the same as habitual body. In this sense, my view differs significantly from the hypothesis of “liberal naturalism”, according to which the “social body” has a “self-moving character” that is not reducible to the activity of individuals. Quite to the contrary, I will propose to reconsider the connection between habit and ethical life in terms of inhabitance. By inhabitance, I refer to the specific form in which habituality, far from grounding ethical life, is actually instituted by the norms and traditions of the State in way that is compatible with social sensitivity and practical freedom.
Taichi Miura (KCL) The Soul-Harmonia Theory and its criticism in Plato’s Phaedo (85e3-86d3, 91c7-95a3)

In the Phaedo, Socrates’ discussant partner Simmias proposes the Soul-Harmonia theory, which regards the soul as an attunement (harmonia) composed of the body’s elements (85e3-86d3). This theory poses a counter argument against Socrates’ proof of the immortality of the soul based on the Affinity Argument (78b-84b). According to the argument, the soul is similar to divine existence, and therefore it can maintain its innate intellectual ability and exist as immortal even after parting from the body. However, Simmias refutes this argument by stating that the soul can be mortal even while it has divine elements since the relationship between the soul and body is comparable to that of attunement and a tuned lyre. Although attunement is beautiful and divine, it cannot exist after the lyre is destroyed. The soul is therefore not assured of its immortality after departing from the body. This theory also implies a different causal theory. In the affinity argument, the soul is the cause of human’s action. However, the theory claims that the soul seems to be a derivative of the material constitution.

Socrates develops the criticism against the theory (91c-95a). However, when interpreting Socrates’ criticism, some contemporary scholars tend to concentrate on clarifying harmonia as a concept, as it can include a wide range of meanings and its argument has a complicated structure (e.g. Gallop, 1975). As a result, severe critiques rest on Socrates’ vague use of the concept of harmonia, which reduces the theory to absurdity in the wrong way. Socrates uses a logical form of proof by contradiction, therefore that vagueness seems to be even more significant. However, we must also consider two important contextual points besides the clarification. The first point is that the Soul-Harmonia Theory is formed by conversation between Socrates and Simmias. In this theory, Simmias’ understanding of harmonia and the soul is reflected. Yet, his comprehension of those concepts is not adequate. Socrates in fact clarifies Simmias’ vague or inadequate comprehension through discussion. In that sense, the vague meaning of the term in this criticism of the theory is not necessarily Socrates’ failure. The second important point is that Socrates repeatedly asks Simmias if that theory accords with Simmias’ other beliefs (92c3, 95a1-2). What Socrates demands is not only that the theory be true as an independent theory but also that it coexists in harmony with Simmias’ other beliefs.

By articulating these two points, this paper will go on to explore the Soul-Harmonia Theory, and the method of its criticism for Phaedo. Through this research, we will understand that Socrates intends to show a serious failure in the theory, and moreover to suggest a better theory which accords with their other agreements about the soul. This serves to show effectively a clear contrast between them in terms of causation. Socrates’ criticism sharply attacks Simmias’ belief that deals with the soul as being subordinated to material orders.
Chris Meyns (Utrecht University) - ‘Souls in Space’

Can souls extend in space? The issue was contested in the seventeenth century. A plausible suggestion is that the historical debate about extended souls was driven by views of the nature of the soul—specifically, about whether souls are material or immaterial. If the soul is material, the thought would be, then it must be extended; whereas if the soul is immaterial, then it cannot be extended. Here I explain how this attractive interpretation cannot be the whole story. This is because it faces counterexamples. Some early modern authors, such as the Cambridge platonist Henry More, hold that souls can be both immaterial and extended. More’s stance that souls are immaterial, extended things may sound surprising. However, I show that it, as well as the other positions in the debate on extended souls, makes perfect sense once a further factor is brought in: space itself. In the seventeenth century, More is among the first authors who (prior to Newton) adopts a view of space as something that exists of itself, independently (i.e. substantivalism). Up to that point, the common view of space was that it is nothing at all, or at least something reducible to things occupying space (as in nihilism, or relationalism). That common view the idea of immaterial extension would not have made sense. However, precisely his acceptance of the new idea that space is independent of things enables More to consistently claim that immaterial items can be spatially extended. By bringing out the relevance of this deeper shift in notions of space, I offer a new interpretation of the debate on extended souls. I show that this debate cannot be fully understood by focusing exclusively on disagreements about psychology, and whether souls are material or immaterial. Instead, to an important extent the positions in this debate are driven by changing conceptions in the philosophy of nature.
The distinction between formal and objective reality, which derives from Scholasticism, plays an important role in Descartes’ philosophy. For him, a thing’s formal reality is its being, and its objective reality is its representational content. Spinoza’s use of this distinction is less well understood. I will argue in this paper that understanding this distinction, in the specific way that Spinoza intends, is crucial for a correct interpretation of parallelism: his theory that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. The interdependence between these two theories has been generally overlooked in Spinoza scholarship, but, without acknowledging it, the doctrine of parallelism remains at worst obscure, or at best unoriginal.

In the first section of my paper, I will highlight the proximity of Spinoza’s views to post-Thomistic positions (e.g., Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, Petrus Aureolus) and to Descartes’ Third Meditation. In this regard, I will show that Spinoza is much closer to these Scholastic sources than Descartes himself was. However, I will also suggest that, despite the striking analogies between Spinoza and his predecessors, in the Ethics he develops an innovative distinction between objective and formal reality.

In my second section, I will argue that the detachment of Spinoza’s views from previous formulations depends on three key-elements: 1) the complete settlement of his causal theory accomplished in the Ethics; 2) the rejection of the equation between objective being and representation; 3) the radical reformulation of the ‘Demiurge scheme’ (i.e., the theory that God creates reality according to the ideas contained in his mind). Likewise, I will claim that the ultimate originality of Spinoza’s distinction involves both the rejection of the notion of a creative intellect and the shelving of Descartes’ a priori proof for God’s existence.

Finally in the third section, I will argue that the absence of causal interaction between the objective being of ideas and the formal being of things is a precise requirement of Spinoza’s parallelism theory, which demands a new variant of the formal-objective distinction, namely, one in which the notion of objective being of ideas is replaced by that of the formal being of ideas. It will be therefore possible to acknowledge the originality of Spinoza’s position when compared with Descartes’ views, and also his creative attitude toward Scholastic terminology, which he revives in his metaphysics.
Sasha Mudd (Southampton) What good is education for Kant?

Much recent work on Kant’s philosophy of education has focused on the relationship of pedagogy to the development of individual moral character and virtue (Munzel 1999; Herman 2007). This literature has tended to be shadowed, in one way or another, by the puzzle of how, if at all, students may be taught to realize their autonomy (Roth and Surprenant 2012). But the achievement of autonomy is not only an individual good for Kant. It is also a collective one. In Kant’s social and political philosophy, a student’s education appears not so much as a means to her own moral development, but rather to a final historical end the importance of which transcends the individual and her moral self-realization (IUA: 8:17). Kant writes that students are tasked with advancing human progress toward the final aim of a moral world (IUA 8:18). This raises a distinct set of puzzles that do not concern the possibility of individual moral education, but rather the relation of the individual to the social good in Kant’s thought.

In this paper I use Kant’s account of education to explore the tension between the individual and social meaning of autonomy in his thought. The thesis I develop is that Kant’s philosophy of education leaves open a disturbing possibility: namely, that the moral development of the individual – as a concrete being – is subordinated to a larger historical project in which she plays a merely generic role as a representative of the species and its rational progress. I further wish to suggest that Kant is sensitive to the problematic nature of this possibility, and that through it he raises the problem of the relation of the individual to the social good in a new form. The enduring legacy of this problem can be seen as framing the social thought of his inheritors in both the German and English speaking traditions.
The aim of my paper is to identify the consequences of the development of experimental philosophy, i.e. science, to our theoretical understanding of the notion of intentionality, especially through René Descartes’s work during the mid seventeenth century and Franz Brentano’s work during the late nineteenth century. I begin with a discussion of Descartes’ attempt to establish a foundation for the sciences, which led him to posit a substantive distinction between the mind and the body. This dualistic framework led to at least two consequences for the science of the mind (i.e., the rigorous and systematic study of the mind, which includes the philosophy of mind and psychology): 1) it provided the impetus to treat the science of the mind as distinct from the science of the body, thereby establishing a distinction between the science of the mind and physiology, and 2) it led to what I refer to as the problem of intentionality, which is the problem of providing an adequate theory of intentionality that can help unify the philosophy of mind and psychology into a single science of the mind. In his attempt to provide an empirical foundation for psychology, Brentano provides what some might understand as a solution for the problem of intentionality. First, he argues for a unification of physiology and psychology under his framework of psychology from an empirical standpoint, and second he offers his thesis of intentional in-existence to serve as the unifying principle between the disciplines of psychology and physiology. In doing so, Brentano establishes a “psychology without a soul.”

Brentano’s thesis of intentional in-existence (BIIT) asserts that all and only mental phenomena have the property of intentional in-existence. I argue that in light of current work in interdisciplinary research on emotions, Brentano’s solution proves to be an inadequate solution to the problem of intentionality. I do so by clarifying some
significant terms, presenting some falsifying conditions for BIIT’s premises, and then illustrating how philosophical and psychological theories of emotion fulfill these falsifying conditions. Furthermore, I also locate the inadequacy of BIIT in resolving the problem of intentionality in Brentano’s elimination of the soul. By doing so, Brentano transmutes the use of the notion of intentionality, while also maintaining its original meaning, which can be traced back to Aristotle. Finally, I conclude my paper by drawing out the following implications of my conclusion: 1) that a criterion for any adequate theory of intentionality may be that it responds to the challenge of the problem of intentionality, 2) that the notion of intentionality may be necessarily grounded in a non-dualistic metaphysics, and 3) that an empirical or experimental approach to philosophy of mind and psychology may depend on an emergent or non-reductive materialistic framework rather than a dualistic framework nor a materialistic reductionist framework.
Peirce’s conception of habit saw increasingly sophisticated development during his late years (1900-1914). His studies of continuity and logic allowed him to describe habits as the real way in which “ideas become clear”, in the celebrated pragmatic maxim (1878). In fact, with this anti-dualist view pragmatism opposes both rationalism and empiricism, finding a unique path to rationality. That is why Peirce strove all his life to find good examples and a keen analysis of what a habit of action was, leading him to three paths: i) phenomenological, ii) semiotic/logical, iii) stechiological (‘elemental’).

In any meaningful habit of action, feelings (phenomenological firstness, according to Peirce), physical actions (secondness), and order of actions (thirdness) are included, as well as icons (semiotic representations by similarity), indices (by contiguity), and symbols (by interpretation). At the same time, in meaningful habits some vague idea “takes body” and acquires a general meaning (this is the ‘elemental’ description). Peirce thought that his Existential Graphs, the iconic-based logic that he invented, could work because of the simultaneous use of all these levels of phenomena and representation. However, deepening and generalizing Peirce’s semiotic and phenomenological observations, we can say that also in ordinary life there are many habits that can carry on meaning, allowing us to know something more while we perform them. I name these “complete gestures”.

For example, in a public oath or a scientific experiment or an artwork, a vague idea becomes clear, namely it gains a general recognizable meaning, by performing a particular series of actions according to a specific law. The oath of the President of the US allows us to recognize in one “complete gesture” the meaning of otherwise vague ideas of tradition, power, responsibility, etc. In shaping these complete gestures we need to be creative by aesthetically hypothesizing the elements and order we should use. But, using Peirce’s understanding of ethics, we also need an ethical judgment, insofar as we need to judge whether the complex blending of phenomena and signs is apt to accomplish the task of transforming vague ideas into a general meaning passing through determinate actions. Taking the oath example, is this sort of gesture (with the whole semiotic and phenomenological elements implied in the ceremony) adequate to make everyone involved understand all meanings connected to the role of the President of the US? Clearly, in this perspective ethics is conceived in an unusual way, which is epistemically centered (I), has a logic (II), and is internal to gestures themselves (III). A gesture will then be ‘moral’ according to the internal capacity of shaping a meaning and carrying it from an indeterminate idea to the generality of comprehension.
The aim of this paper is to defend a reading of Descartes’ theory of sensory perception in which, as opposed to a widespread interpretation, the mind is not a passive receiver of inputs from the environment, but an active decoder of neural information that contributes to the propositional content of ideas. Given his mechanistic conception of matter, Descartes developed detailed physiological descriptions of the interaction between external objects and the brain. He envisaged this as an isomorphic relation in which the qualities of objects are explained in terms of geometrically derived properties (shape, size, position, and motion of micro-corpuscles). This process is often read as culminating with the mind being passively 'affected' by the corporeal isomorph. Certainly, Descartes’ descriptions are often ambiguous, but the reading of mental passivity remains inadequate.

I argue for this interpretation through three claims. First, Descartes is concerned about a refined version of the mind-body problem that is not equivalent to the problem of interaction. It is rather a problem of dissimilarity between mental representations and mechanistic explanations that, interestingly, reflects a worry that is very much alive in contemporary philosophy of mind. The question is how the qualitative character of sensory experiences can arise from the categories of physical science. Second, Descartes’ account of brain-mind interaction accommodates a metaphysically interesting distinction between types of causes. This is supported by a textual fact that has been overlooked in the literature. Namely, that Descartes constructed a narrative that avoids expressions suggesting actual contact between brain and mind, while capturing a different type of cause that operates in an equally law-like manner. His choice of words for describing interaction might seem erratic but, in fact, it persistently reveals a delicate balance between the dismissal of efficient causation and the evoking of genuine causal powers.

Third, in the light of this exegesis, it is possible to reconstruct a causal story for brain-mind interaction along the lines of a semantic model based on Descartes’ identification of neural events with ‘natural signs’. In a semantic model, the mind becomes an active interpreter of isomorphs by producing meaningful outcomes in the form of ideas. Natural signs have been often interpreted as a mere analogy in Descartes’ theory, but I suggest that, on the contrary, the introduction of natural signs is the closest that Descartes got to fleshing out the workings of interaction. It is consonant with his terminology and it reveals mental activity as a necessary feature for the intelligibility of perceptual experience.

By reassessing Descartes’ views on mental activity, this interpretation presents a lucid description of perception that goes beyond the rigid rationalism that is credited to him. By taking a common description of dissimilarity between objects and ideas as a starting point, it explores an alternative, textually robust causal story for body-mind interaction, and it offers a different way of understanding the genesis of the notion of mental activity within the debate of sensory perception in Early Modern philosophy.
Rory Phillips (UCL) – ‘Davidson as a Conceptual Idealist’

Since Nagel (1986) it has been sometimes thought that there might be some form of idealism in the background of Davidson’s work, especially the positions outlined and defended in *On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme* (1975) and related papers. This paper seeks to add to that debate by identifying the form of idealism that Davidson may be committed to, and arguing that Davidson is indeed committed to it. Haddock (2011) has recently argued that Davidson’s idealism is a form of Transcendental Idealism, specifically Kantian transcendental idealism, as opposed to Wittgensteinian.

In my view, Haddock misattributes Davidson’s commitment as he has not considered another similar form of idealism. This is Conceptual Idealism, most famously defended by Rescher (1972, 1973, 1991). I give an outline of Rescher’s position, and the similarities between Rescher (who takes himself to be working in a somewhat attenuated Kantian framework) and Kant. The main thesis of Conceptual Idealism is that the concept of mind is spread throughout and is not eliminable from all our other concepts. Rescher’s similarity to and debt to Kant, explains, on my account, why Haddock misidentifies Davidsonian idealism as Transcendental Idealism.

My argument for attributing Conceptual Idealism to Davidson is twofold. One is based around an expansion of Nagel’s original position, which is the idea that Davidson has to deny that there are truths that are unknowable because of the kind of beings that we are. Nagel takes that denial to express idealism of some kind. By investigating Nagel’s view and responses to his view, notably in Haddock’s recent paper, I show that there is definitely merit in Nagel’s suggestion.

The other argument is based around Davidson’s triangulation position that he defended in various papers throughout the eighties and nineties, starting with *Rational Animals* (1982) and including others such as *The Second Person* (1995) and *The Problem of Objectivity* (1995). I trace the central thought of this account, and identify the most idealistic aspect of it, which is the argument that the triangle is used to fix the content of thought. I take this last claim of Davidson’s to be crucial to getting his account to work, but if we grant this claim then we are left with a form of, in my view, Conceptual Idealism. Davidsonian Conceptual Idealism is stronger than Rescher’s, because Rescher admits, and Davidson denies, the intelligibility of the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes. Therefore I conclude that Davidson is committed to Strong Conceptual Idealism, and not either Kantian or Wittgensteinian Transcendental Idealism.
Andrew Platt (SUNY, Stony Brook) - Models of Efficient Causation in Geulincx and Clauberg

Daniel Garber (1983) makes the provocative suggestion that “for Descartes, mind-body interaction is the paradigm for all causal explanation.” According to Descartes, the human mind acts causally on the body when a volition in the mind brings about a motion in the body to which it is joined. Although he grants that Descartes never actually says as much, Garber claims that Descartes should have held this is the only kind of causation that is intelligible. Walter Ott (2008) argues for a similar reading of Malebranche. According to Ott, Malebranche holds a volitional model of causation, according to which causation is essentially intentional: A cause must be able to intend an effect in order to bring about that effect. On Ott’s reconstruction, this model of causation underlies Malebranche’s key arguments for Occasionalism, or the thesis that God alone is the true cause of all effects.

I argue that, although Descartes could have adopted a volitional model for all causation, there is also some evidence that he would not have. One reason to think that Descartes could have held such a view is that there is at least one Cartesian thinker who does hold this view. That thinker is Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669). In his De virtute et primis ejus proprietatibus (1665), Geulincx appeals to the principle that “I cannot do something that I do not know how to do” to argue for the conclusion that he cannot be the cause of the motions of his body. In his Metaphysica Vera (1691), he extends this argument to things that are “devoid of all thought”, and not just to intellectual agents such as human beings. Steven Nadler (1999) has suggests that, in so doing, Geulincx takes intelligent agents as “the paradigm for causation in general.” Building on this suggestion, I argue that Geulincx’s reasoning makes sense only on the assumption that we should adopt a volitional model for all efficient causation.

I argue that the Cartesian thinker Johann Clauberg (1622-1665) rejects Geulincx’s assumption. In his 1664 treatise, Corporis et animae conjunctio, Clauberg argues that the human mind and body are united by “mutual interaction.” Yet he argues the mind cannot produce motion in the body, nor the body produce thoughts in the mind. That is, the interactions between mind and body are different from cases of efficient causation where the cause creates or conserves its effect. Clauberg characterizes the mind as a “moral cause” of motion in the body to which it is joined, and explains that motions in the body are the “occasion” of thoughts in the mind. According to Clauberg, these relations constitute a mutual dependence between thoughts in the mind and motions in the body. Thus I argue that Clauberg implicitly recognizes two distinct models of efficient causation – one that applies in cases of interactions between bodies, and another that applies in cases of mind-body interaction. I contend that Clauberg’s views about causation are evidence of what Descartes would have said about causation.
At the end of the 19th century, just after the end of the Pacific War that confronted Peruvians and Chileans, a generation of philosophers emerged in Peru that became interested in positivism. They were not greatly influenced by the first generation of European positivists, such as Comte, but mainly by the second generation, especially by Herbert Spencer’s evolutionism. This generation rapidly switched to vitalism and pragmatism around the beginning of 20th century. The influence of pragmatism in Peruvian philosophy had a dual origin. On the one hand, it came from the interest that Peruvian philosophers, such as Jorge Polar, Mariano Iberico and Javier Prado, had taken in William James. On the other hand, it came from Peruvian philosopher Pedro Zulen’s familiarization with the work of Josiah Royce and Charles Sanders Peirce, as well as from his writings on the origins of pragmatism and American neorealism. This paper attempts to describe Zulen’s interpretation of pragmatism, especially of Peirce, as well as the way in which American pragmatism affected the Peruvian philosophical tradition in early twentieth century. The main question in Zulen’s book Del neohegelianismo al neorealismo is about the nature of reality, which he regards to be the central problem in philosophy. In the first chapter, “The English Neohegelianism”, he describes profusely the introduction of German romanticism in England through Coleridge and Carlyle, and in the United States through Ralph Waldo Emerson. For Zulen, British neohegelianism, especially Caird, Bradley and Bosanquet, distances itself from empiricism in order to inherit, from Kant, the idea that Zulen subscribes regarding the irreducibility of the mental to the physical. Zulen, however, rejects the notion of a thing in itself. The section devoted to neohegelianism in the United States begins with a description of the School of Saint Louis: H. Brockmeyer, William T. Harris and Denton J. Zinder. Although they were not professional philosophers, they were among the first intellectuals in the United States that taught and translated into English the works of German idealism. Harris founded the Journal of Speculative Philosophy in 1867, in which he published his research. Zulen believes that it was thanks to Harris and to the School of Saint Louis that Peirce, Royce and James were possible. Although that is a controversial statement, what is true is that Peirce started out by studying of Kant, and Royce by studying Hegel, which could have been motivated by the School of Saint Louis. This contribution, therefore, will describe the early influence of pragmatism in Latinamerica, taking as a study case, Peru. It will focus on Pedro Zulen and the way he understood and processed American pragmatism as a result of British and American neohegelianism.
Stephen Read (University of Saint Andrews) “Aristotle's Theory of the Assertoric Syllogism”

Abstract: Although the theory of the assertoric syllogism was Aristotle's great invention, one which dominated logical theory for the succeeding two millenia, accounts of the syllogism evolved and changed over that time. Indeed, in the twentieth century, doctrines were attributed to Aristotle which lost sight of what Aristotle intended. One of these mistaken doctrines was the very form of the syllogism: that a syllogism consists of three propositions containing three terms arranged in four figures. Yet another was that a syllogism is a conditional proposition deduced from a set of axioms. There is even unclarity about what the basis of syllogistic validity consists in. Returning to Aristotle's text we find a coherent and precise theory which shows all these claims to be based on a misunderstanding and misreading.
While staring at the flames which publicly devoured the copies of *De Cive* and *Leviathan* at Oxford University in 1683, more than one divine was to breathe a sigh of relief. Thomas Hobbes, the philosopher that in *De Cive* had claimed historical credit for giving a stable foundation to morals, thus undermining the undisputed domination of the verbose as well as inconclusive volumes of the casuists, was actually viewed by Catholic and Reformed theologians alike as the subverter of Christian ethics and the desecrator of its key category: conscience. In the wake of a centuries-old condemnation, even the majority of modern critics have treated Hobbes’s reflection on conscience as the opportunistic attempt to contain, if not even destroy, the gravest threat to the system. After all, wasn’t it the very philosopher of Malmesbury who, in *The Elements of Law*, attacked conscience as the source of “all seditions concerning religion and ecclesiastical government”? Yet, the judgment of old and new opponents of Hobbes’s ethical doctrine rests on a fundamental misconception. When the philosopher, in chapter 29 of *Leviathan*, earned the unanimous wrath of Catholics and Protestants by maintaining that the cardinal tenet of Christian morality, according to which “whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin”, is a “doctrine repugnant to civil society”, he was not bordering on heresy in order to disqualify a “reverenced name” and suppress Christian liberty altogether. Far from dismissing conscience once for all for political ends, Hobbes entered the arena of biblical exegesis and theological disputes to provide the governing principle of human action with a scientific grounding. As a means to show why and how Hobbes eventually made the *cum-scientia* the pivot of political unity, while securing the public sphere from private convictions on right and wrong, this paper opens with a reconstruction of the intellectual context of Hobbes’s philosophical enterprise. This way, it explains the reasons why, in the “Age of Conscience”, the “rule of conduct” was paradoxically going through a profound crisis which called for a restoration of its ability to provide a universal guidance of action. Secondly, the paper illustrates how the necessity to neutralize the threats to political unity posed by erroneous opinions on right and wrong led Hobbes to engage in a critical debate with the fiercest advocate of the rights of conscience, who set the theoretical framework for all the Christian debates on moral obligation: Thomas Aquinas. After analysing the inner workings of the Thomistic *conscientia* and placing it against the backdrop of the Medieval debates on the obligatory force of an erroneous conscience, the third part of the paper explores Hobbes’s criticism of the “Doctor Angelicus”. It therefore demonstrates how Hobbes, through the etymology of “conscience” expounded in the seventh chapter of *Leviathan*, uncovered the origin of the pathologies that affect individual judgment together with the means of its rectification, so as to dissolve the “Kingdom of Darkness”. 
The two most discussed and studied pragmatist philosophers in Brazil are undoubtedly Peirce and Dewey.

Dewey became known first, through the works of philosopher and pedagogue Anísio Teixeira, who studied with Dewey at Teacher’s College, Columbia University, during the 1920’s. Back to Brazil, Teixeira worked to put Dewey’s ideas to work, both in his writings on education and his political practice as a public administrator. It’s in his book Progressive Education (1934) that this influence is most noticeable. At the time he published this book, he held a high position in the Brazilian Ministry of Education, participating with others at the movement called “The new school”. Teixeira suffered virulent and constant attacks from extreme-right-wing intellectuals, and was eventually persecuted during the ditactorship of the 1960’s. But through his work, Dewey’s thought influenced Brazil’s most known and worldly read thinker, Paulo Freire, who dubbed Dewey’s definitive assertion on democracy: democracy is not a form of government, it is first and foremost a way of life. And through Freire’s hands, Dewey influenced the ideal of a “reflective teacher” during the 1990’s.

As for Peirce, only in the late 1960’s his ideas became known to a wider Brazilian public. The first reception of Peirce’s thought was through lectures and writings of two of the main poets, theorists and literary critics of the concretist movement, Haroldo de Campos and Decio Pignatari. Acquainted with the works of Roman Jakobson, Max Bense, Umberto Eco and others, Campos and Pignatari began lecturing on Peirce’s semiotic: Pignatari began teaching Peirce’s semiotic among other things still during the late 1960’s in the Superior School of Industrial Design, in Rio de Janeiro, and Campos first taught a course on Peirce when he and Pignatari became professors in the Program for Graduate Studies in Literary Theory at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, which later (1978) was expanded into a Communication and Semiotics Studies Program. From this first approaches, numerous workshops, master’s dissertations and phd’s on Peirce’s semiotics flourished, firstly with an interest in applying it to visual and artistic languages, then later with an interest in his philosophy per se which is still growing.

Today, there are two University Centers for Studies focusing mainly on Peirce’s ideas in PUC-SP, and at least another one, in Bahia, for pragmatism in general. Through these receptions, the work of those two philosophers established firm roots in Brazil. But it seems that the power of their ideas is not really recognized in full extent in traditional philosophical circles. The aim of this presentation is to pursue these lineages of continuous influence questioning some common assumptions of the Brazilian philosophical scene.
Both Kant and Schelling want a libertarian conception of freedom. Kant though, views the world of experience as entirely determined by natural necessity, and thereby locates freedom outside of it. In doing so, he faces a whole host of problems. Schelling by contrast, attempts to develop a conception of nature that can accommodate a libertarian conception of freedom within it. In this paper, I consider this transition from Kant to Schelling, and argue in Schelling’s favour.

I begin with a sketch of transcendental idealism, focusing on the 3rd antinomy and the fact of reason, where our freedom is revealed to us. I then go on to discuss the problems that locating freedom outside of nature causes for Kant. These problems are both metaphysical and epistemic. In locating freedom outside of nature, Kant struggles to account for how freedom and nature interact and how we can have empirical knowledge of freedom.

Having laid out some problems with Kant’s account, I turn to Schelling. In locating freedom within nature, I argue that he overcomes the metaphysical and epistemic problems that Kant faces. However, he also faces issues of his own. For one, at times, Schelling seems like he wants to provide something like an explanation of how freedom emerges from nature. I contrast this with Kant’s claim that freedom is inexplicable, and say something in Kant’s favour here. I end by looking at an alternative account of freedom that we find in Hegel, where freedom is in nature, but cannot be explained in natural terms.
What is Recollection in the Meno?

In the Meno, recollection is introduced as a solution to Meno’s paradox (i.e. a man can neither search for what he knows, nor for what he does not know). (80e1-5) By questioning a slave boy to help him to solve a geometrical problem, Socrates tries to demonstrate that one can learn something by recollection. However, it has been widely debated on the interpretation of recollection: Is it a method of acquiring knowledge or learning (Benson, 1990; Scott, 2009), a hypothesis (Landry, 2012), a mere myth (Sternfeld & Zyskind, 1978), or a priori truth (Moravcsik, 1971)? This paper aims to articulate the role and nature of recollection in the Meno.

Firstly, I shall distinguish two senses of recollection in the Meno. The broad sense refers to a general theory of knowledge and soul, which presents the way of the retention and acquisition of knowledge in the immortal soul. The narrow sense refers to a method of knowledge-acquisition, which is applied to help a man to acquire (or recover) knowledge. I shall further argue that recollection (as a method) is a solution to Meno’s paradox, while recollection (as a theory) is Plato’s holistic attempt to synthesise the immortality of the soul and the problem of knowledge-acquisition.

Secondly, in contrast to Sternfeld and Zyskind (1978), I shall argue that recollection as a method is not mysterious, nor is it merely a process of remembering or recalling. Rather, I shall show that recollection is a method of learning by the elenchus and the hypothetic method. In addition, I shall note that the slave boy case is a demonstration of recollection (as a method) rather than of recollection (as a theory).

Thirdly, I shall argue that in the Meno, all learning (of knowledge) is recollection, given Plato’s distinction between true belief (δόξα) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). For Plato, I shall argue that all true beliefs only become knowledge by the means of recollection.
Laëticia Simonetta (ENS Lyon Ihrim) ‘Common sense and the knowledge of God in Buffier’s *Traité des premières vérités*’

In his *Traité des premières vérités*, first published in 1724, the Jesuit father Buffier aims at establishing the fundamental truths that don’t need to be demonstrated or proved. His concern is epistemological rather than metaphysical: as a matter of fact, it is against vulgar’s prejudices and philosopher’s tortuous discussions that Buffier tries to clear out which are the true principles on which we could rely with confidence. He does recognize in Descartes’ *Cogito* a universal and indubitable truth, known by the sole intern perception. Hence, he identifies as a first source of knowledge the “intimate sentiment of our perceptions [*sentiment intime de nos perceptions*]”, which gives access not exclusively to the truth of our own existence, but also to other truths, such as mathematical axioms. Nevertheless, he does not follow Descartes when he claims that no idea known by this intimate sentiment could provide any knowledge about the external world: the idea of the infinite is not very clear in itself, and can’t be the appropriate and sufficient ground of our knowledge of the existence of other bodies and other minds. He denies that we have an innate idea of God, but above all, claims that the intuition of an internal idea can’t provide any other knowledge than that of our own minds. As Berkeley sees scepticism and atheism as the necessary outcome of Descartes’ philosophy, Buffier claims that the sole intimate sentiment of our own perception is helpless to escape from solipsism. That is why he identifies “common sense [*sens commun*]” as a second source of knowledge, being a disposition of nature, common to nearly whole humans, that brings us to judge about things that differ from those known by intimate sentiment. These judgments can’t be demonstrated but are nonetheless absolutely clear, and play the role of first principles of knowledge. Thus, common sense is the source and ground of my knowing that “there are other beings and other human beings than me in the world”, or that something which is well-ordered can’t be the effect of chance. These principles are the foundations of our knowledge of the existence of God, which we can’t know by the intimate sentiment nor by an *a priori* demonstration.

Common sense, in Buffier’s philosophy, doesn’t need the guarantee of God to provide certainty. In philosophy, separated from theology, we may found in ourselves a source of knowledge other than the intuition of ideas: a natural disposition, common to all men, to judge in certain determinate ways. Ancient philosophers as scholastics and major modern authors like Descartes, Malebranche and Locke, should restrain their ambition to prove and examine what doesn’t need to: too many thoughts makes them lose their common sense and may lead to scepticism and atheism. Common sense then seems to be the best guarantee for our knowledge of God.
William James’s preoccupation with research into telepathy, mediumship and other unorthodox questions is well known, yet James scholars have often passed over his controversial interests or construed them as curious eccentricities discontinuous with his philosophical project. By reconstructing part of the network of psychical researchers which James was a member of, and by addressing the role of antipathies by psychological and philosophical critics to James’s Pragmatist project in their attacks on his psychical research, this paper will attempt to redress a fundamental historiographical imbalance in James scholarship in particular and the history of Pragmatism in general.

Not long after James started investigating mediums, he formulated Pragmatist key tenets in a critique of epistemological prescriptions popularized by Thomas Huxley and William Clifford, who insisted that belief in spiritual principles in the absence of conclusive evidence was inherently unethical. James’s English collaborators in psychical research shared James’s misgivings. In particular, it was Henry Sidgwick’s pupil and friend Edmund Gurney who voiced similar critiques, insisting in line with James on the individual’s prerogative to believe as long as grounds for faith were not actually refuted, if belief was undogmatic and open to revision, and, most importantly, if it served as a viable coping device in the face of hardships of life.

The German-born Oxford philosopher and leading representative of Pragmatism in Europe, Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, was another keen advocate of psychical research and likewise maintained links to members of the ‘Sidgwick group’. Like James and other major philosophers like Sidgwick and Henri Bergson, Schiller was to become a President of the Society for Psychological Research. Moreover, he was the one proponent of Pragmatism whose concerns James professed were closest to his own, and for a short time he even adopted Schiller’s term ‘Humanism’ as a label for his own Pragmatist philosophy.

Schiller also became involved in public controversies around psychical research, where polemical critiques relied on Enlightenment principles that assumed the inherently regressive and morbid nature of belief in ‘occult’ phenomena, and on the sovereignty of reason as the only admissible foundation of belief. At the basis of James’s and Schiller’s Pragmatist conceptions of truth and belief, on the other hand, was an argument that appeared fundamentally at odds with Enlightenment principles: In the final analysis, they argued, there was no escape from acknowledging the self-confirming nature and passionable foundation of supposedly rational presuppositions, which James and Schiller held were based on goal-oriented mental processes that were ultimately unconscious.
Johannes Steizinger (Vienna) Philosophy and history from the perspective of life. Friedrich Nietzsche and Wilhelm Dilthey

The rise of both historicism and the empirical sciences had significant impact on the “identity crisis of philosophy” (Schnädelbach) in the second part of the nineteenth century. In this context, philosophy of life emerged as a promising reply to the challenges facing philosophy in the age of history and science. I examine two exemplary approaches of this particular re-orientation of philosophy and analyse their different strategies regarding the problem of relativism. In their mature works, Friedrich Nietzsche and Wilhelm Dilthey take the concept of life as starting point for their new concepts of philosophy. I attempt to show both the common tendency and the different results of their diagnosis of and proposed solution to the “identity crisis of philosophy”.

Nietzsche’s mature philosophy captures the philosophical challenges of the late nineteenth century in an exemplary way. In Twilight of Idols (1889), Nietzsche advocates a philosophy of reality that takes into account both history and science. Moreover, he presents his approach as a completely fresh start of philosophy and dismisses the whole philosophical tradition. But he also realizes the dangers of modernity and its culture of empirical knowledge. In his Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche characterizes “modern science” and “modern historiography” as most recent manifestations of the “ascetic ideal”. By drawing his attention to the practical presuppositions and ethical consequences of the scientific and the historical attitude, he recognizes the threat of nihilism in modernity. It is exactly this critical diagnosis of nihilism that gives philosophy a new significance. Nietzsche calls for “new philosophers” who use history and science for their future work. Here, “life” becomes the ultimate standard to guide the philosopher’s “revaluation of all values” (see also Hussain). I shall argue that it is his very concept of life that enables Nietzsche to ignore the problem of relativism regarding his own re-orientation of philosophy.

Dilthey develops a related, but divergent approach. He thinks that the nineteenth century revealed the historicity of humanity and, in doing this, showed the necessity of the historical standpoint regarding all manifestations of human life. I shall focus on his application of the historical standpoint to philosophy in itself which is developed in his late theory of worldviews. Dilthey regards the relativistic consequences of the historical standpoint as a problem for which he proposes a dialectical solution. He is convinced that the “historical consciousness” itself does not only show the historical relativity of all philosophical systems, but also offers a new objective foundation of philosophy. For Dilthey, deep historical insight reveals that life always shows the same aspects and, hence, discovers the steady, stable and regular forms of human life. I analyse the role of life in Dilthey’s strategy to block historical relativism and compare the resulting concept of philosophy to Nietzsche’s.
Andrew Stephenson (Humboldt University, Berlin) Kant on Knowability and A Priori Cognition as Tacit Knowledge

We are in possession of certain a priori cognitions, and even the common understanding is never without them. (B3)

For all propositions of philosophy are known to everyone

(Anthropology Mrongovius 25:1221-2)

It is a point now well recognized that Kant’s conception of cognition (Erkenntnis) may be fundamentally different from our contemporary conception of knowledge. The point goes beyond observing an infelicity of translation. One of Kant’s primary concerns in the Critique of Pure Reason is an account of a priori cognition in metaphysics. If this is not a theory of a priori knowledge, then what is it? I will defend, by novel means, a novel answer to this question. Kant’s account of a priori cognition in metaphysics is an account of what we must already count as knowing tacitly if we are to have a world in view at all. It is one of the central tasks of transcendental philosophy to make such tacit knowledge explicit. As Kant puts it in the Analytic of Principles, ‘Now our task is to exhibit in systematic combination the judgments that the understanding actually brings about a priori’ (A148/B187). This constitutes a move from Erkenntnis to Wissen, from mere cognition to scientific knowledge proper.

My route will be indirect and the paper is in two parts. In the first part (§§I-II), I appeal to contemporary work on semantic anti-realism to argue on philosophical grounds that Kant is committed to the thesis that all synthetic a priori truths in scientific theoretical metaphysics are known. This is not just because he thinks he knows them himself. Kant is committed to the thesis holding under extremely minimal conditions. In the second part (§§III-IV), instead of taking this result to be a reductio of Kant’s position, I consider how he might embrace it. The thesis is not absurd, nor is it too idealist for Kant, if such truths derive from the essential structure of human experience and if the knowledge in question is of a special kind already implicated in the mere partaking of such experience.

In Kant’s hands, the thesis that all such truths are known becomes a view about knowledge that everyone must always have – knowledge that, like the tacitly known truths themselves, forms a necessary condition on the possibility of experience.

At the heart of this account is the idea that knowing tacitly that p essentially involves being normatively bound to p – p functions as a rule that governs reasoning with and/or the justification of empirical judgments. So understood, the thesis provides an interesting perspective on transcendental idealism and Kant’s Critical project more generally, it
coheres with a number of Kant’s core doctrines, including those in his practical
philosophy, and contains important lessons for how we are to understand Kant’s
relations to certain of his Early Modern predecessors, in particular Leibniz, Crusius, and
Tetens on the topic of innatism.
Martin Sticker (Göttingen) ‘Moral Education and Transcendental Idealism’

Recently, there has been a surge of excellent work on moral education in Kant. In this paper, we want to highlight a tension between Kant’s views on the importance of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our claim is that transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to have a workable account of moral education.

We begin by outlining moral education in Kant (§1). We look to show both how this works on Kant’s account, and also how important he takes moral education to be. Kant believes that his theory is to be preferred over more popular contenders, amongst other reasons, because it can help to make rational agents morally better. Kant believes that no other theory can do this (see IV:411). This means it would be a problem for Kant if he cannot make good on this claim.

We then turn to sketch the basic contours of transcendental idealism (§2), focusing on Kant’s claims that (transcendental) freedom: occurs outside of time; and cannot be experienced.

With this in view, we draw attention to some tensions between moral education and transcendental idealism (§3). We contend that, through locating freedom outside of experience and time, Kant’s account of education faces metaphysical, epistemic and methodological problems. These problems come down to two main issues: (i) Moral education requires freedom to change over time, and through interaction with the empirical world, which is hard to reconcile with transcendental idealism. (ii) Due to Kant’s famous claim that we can never point to any action done for the sake of the moral law, he faces a problem in verifying which kind of education works, and even whether education makes any difference at all.

Finally, we consider two ways in which Kant might resolve these tensions (§4). We discuss a recent proposal by Frierson that there could be markers of freedom in the empirical world as well as the reply that Kant’s ethics assumes a practical standpoint which makes the problems we outline in the previous section disappear, but argue that neither of these strategies are satisfactory.

We conclude that a real tension remains between transcendental idealism and Kant’s account of moral education.
Robert Stern (Sheffield) - ‘Løgstrup and MacIntyre on Natural Law’

One of the significant ways in which MacIntyre seeks to distinguish between his position and that of K. E. Løgstrup, is by associating himself with the Thomistic natural law tradition on the one hand, while discarding any natural law reading of Løgstrup on the other, arguing that ‘Løgstrup rejected, and his position required him to reject, any conception of the natural law’. I will argue, contra MacIntyre, that Løgstrup’s ethics is ultimately best understood as a form of natural law theory, though one that differs fundamentally from the way that is understood in the Thomistic tradition – hence diagnosing MacIntyre’s error.

The paper will make this case by looking at the influence of Luther’s conception of ‘ordinances’ on Løgstrup’s position, which treats as us bound together in relations of responsibility for one another, which must be respected if our lives are to flourish. I will show how it is this conception of relations of responsibility that Løgstrup incorporates into his idea of the ethical demand, whereby each of us are required to care for the needs of the other; by hereby grounding normativity in what is necessary to collectively make our lives go well, I will argue, Løgstrup deserves to be placed in the natural law tradition. However, I will also argue that Løgstrup differs from others in that tradition, including Aquinas and also contemporary so-called ‘new natural law theorists’ such as Grisez and Finnis, in not seeking to derive from this account any fixed and universal determinate social norms (such as marriage or property). In exploring the reasons for this difference, I will show how Løgstrup represents a radical and attractive break with the way in which natural law theory has been developed – and thus a challenge to MacIntyre’s own championing of this tradition.
In this paper I will present Averroes' theory on the question of the subject-matter of metaphysics and then show how the Spanish Franciscan Antonius Andreas understood Averroes' position. I will introduce, discuss, and critical evaluate the three arguments that Antonius brings forward against Averroes. Ultimately, I will defend Averroes against Antonius' criticism.

The Arabic commentator and philosopher Averroes (Ibn Rušd, d. 1198) gives original answers to the related questions of the subject-matter of metaphysics and the ability of this science to prove the existence of the first cause. For Averroes, according to his discussion of the topic in his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, metaphysics is the universal science. The only acceptable proof of the existence of the first cause is the proof provided by Aristotle in Physics VIII. Averroes develops a theory which combines the two divergent aspects of the science of metaphysics: the study of the first cause and the study of being insofar as it is being. He does so by concentrating on the type of demonstration that metaphysics employs.

After the Latin translation of the Metaphysics, these themes became subject to much discussion among Medieval Latin thinkers, and Averroes' arguments played a crucial role in the debate among his Latin readers.

Antonius Andreas (d. 1320), a student of Duns Scotus, discusses Averroes' theory in book I of his own Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, a work which has not been thoroughly studied so far, although it eventually became more influential than Scotus' own commentary. The Scotist master paraphrases Averroes' elaborations and condenses them into three theses (dicta). Then he argues against each of these doctrines. Antonius' three points are these: (1) A science can indeed prove the existence of its subject-matter, (2) both physics and metaphysics can prove the existence of the first cause, and (3) the first cause and the intelligences cannot be the subject-matter of metaphysics because they share no common property.

My main argument against Antonius draws on the fact that he uses a specific interpretation of a certain passage from the Posterior Analytics to support the first argument – an interpretation which was actually introduced by Averroes himself to argue in favour of his own position.

Since these arguments became highly influential, and were both adopted and challenged by later authors, I will discuss how philosophically successful these arguments are as objections to Averroes' claims.

This paper also intends to present Antonius' arguments against Averroes as representative of a Scotist position on the subject-matter of metaphysics, and as one of the ways in which the work of the Commentator was received in the Latin west.
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the Brentano school interacted fruitfully with early analytic philosophy; the Russell-Meinong debate is a prime example of this interaction. The Brentano school also interacted with Kant and Neo-Kantians. A central document of this interaction is Stumpf’s article ‘Psychologie and Erkenntnistheorie’. Stumpf’s paper is historically as well as philosophically rich. Brentano is often quoted as saying that Kant is the father of ‘the German School of Common Nonsense Philosophy’. Stumpf dispenses with the polemic and spells out in detail what Brentanians criticize in Kant and Neo-Kantians. He aims to show that the Neo-Kantian conception of philosophy which bans empirical psychological investigations from philosophy/epistemology is not only false, but counter-productive.

In order to see what drives Stumpf’s criticism we will need to articulate the methodology that underpins his work. What sets the Brentano school apart from the founding fathers of analytic philosophy is their concept originalism. While Russell and Moore aimed to give analytic definitions of concepts, Brentano and his students proposed to illuminate concepts by providing genealogical accounts. Given how scarce analytic definitions of philosophically central concepts are, this might be a promising alternative.

What sets the Brentano school apart from Kant and Neo-Kantians is their concept empiricism. For every concept there is a perception or some perceptions that are its source. No concept has, as Kantians claim, an a priori source.

Stumpf’s ‘Psychologie and Erkenntnistheorie’ is a defence of Brentanian concept originalism and empiricism against the Neo-Kantian view that (i) there are a priori intuitions (space and time) and concepts (causation, necessity) and (ii) psychological investigations should be replaced by deductions of such concepts. Stumpf proceeds by a number of detailed arguments that can be summed up as follows:

If we had no perceptual awareness of X, we would have no concept of X at all.

Therefore, we need start from our perceptual awareness of X to give an account of the concept of X.
But Kantians deny that space, time, causality, necessity etc. are objects of perception. Therefore only the understanding must contribute these concepts and pure intuitions.

Does Stumpf simply beg the crucial question? No, in his Über den Ursprung der Raumvorstellung he developed an account of perceptual awareness that has room for the perception of pluralities and relations and thereby for the perception of located qualities. In later work he completes this with an account of the perception of causation, another relation. This work lays the conceptual foundation of Gestaltpsychologie.

In my talk I will (briefly) introduce Brentano’s metaphilosophy, outline and assess Stumpf’s arguments that aim to defend the Brentanian approach against the Kantians, and chart the further developments of Stumpf’s views on perception.
Spinoza’s philosophy is often criticised for lacking a direct consideration on art. Likewise his dismissive thoughts on beauty, ostensible ‘rationalism’, denial of free will and mechanistic understanding of action, are all often pointed to in order to demonstrate his philosophy’s incompatibility with a positive theory of art. In the two places that Spinoza does discuss art in the *Ethics*, IIIP2Schol and IVP45Schol respectively, he chooses to frame his discussion in terms of the extended body and, specifically, in terms of the complexity of art’s bodies. Similarly in the *Theological-Political Treatise* Spinoza notes of Scripture that it is to be studied naturally and from what follows from its material letter alone. It follows that for Spinoza the method for studying both art and Scripture must begin with an understanding of them in their material existence, as bodies that are constituted by and embedded in an infinite causal network of other bodies.

This paper will argue that by turning to Spinoza’s naturalisation of Scripture in the *Theological-Political Treatise*, and particularly his account of the sanctity of Scripture, we can posit a Spinozist theory of art whereby the determination of a body as art, and the meaning that is then associated with such a body, is understood to arise out of its relations with other bodies, both artistic and non-artistic alike. Accordingly the determination and meaning of an artistic body will be shown to be relational, historical, and subject to the movements of what Spinoza describes as fortune.

Lastly this paper will argue that because the work of art is seen as a ‘part’ that expresses the material conditions of a historical period, its body, just like the Scriptural body, will elicit a degree of understanding of the wider sites of its production. For this reason this paper will conclude by suggesting that in Spinoza's philosophy works of art have the capacity to give rise to dependable knowledge and, more specifically, to a knowledge of the greater social-whole of which the artistic body is a constituent part.
Emily Thomas (Durham) - The Emergence of the Growing Block Theory of Time

We can distinguish several debates surrounding time. One concerns its ontology: ‘substantivalism’ holds that time is a real entity, a kind of substance to be listed on the contents of the universe; this is traditionally opposed to ‘relationism’, which holds that time is merely temporal relations holding between bodies. Another debate concerns the reality of the past, present and future: ‘eternalism’ holds that the past, present and future exists; ‘presentism’ holds that only the present exists; and the ‘growing block theory’ holds that only the past and present exist whilst the future is unreal.

Whilst many theories of time boast centuries-long, meandering histories, the growing block view is a relative newcomer to the philosophical scene, its roots lying in the early decades of the twentieth century. Surprisingly, despite the fact that the growing block theory is enjoying something of a resurgence in twenty-first century metaphysics, there is only a little scholarship on its origins. This paper makes a start at addressing that neglect, placing the growing block theory in its historical context and exploring its philosophical development. Along the way, I advance two theses.

The first concerns the historical appearance of the growing block view. The British emergentist C. D. Broad is correctly hailed as the first advocate of the growing block theory, in his 1923 Scientific Thought. However, I show that Broad’s fellow emergentist Samuel Alexander clearly articulated the growing block view prior to Broad, in Alexander’s 1920 Space, Time, and Deity. Further, I argue that although Alexander is a professed eternalist, his account of deity hints at an unreal future, such that his metaphysics is leaning towards a growing block view.

The second thesis concerns the reasons that prompted Broad to defend the growing block view. I argue that Broad’s newfound conviction in 1920 that time has a direction, coupled with Broad’s relationism about time, led him towards the growing block theory. By way of connecting these theses, I argue that Broad’s views on the intrinsic direction of time (and perhaps even the growing block theory itself) are borrowed from Alexander.
The principle aim of this paper is to describe and compare the respective conceptions of the self found in MacIntyre’s and Løgstrup’s ethical philosophies. By means of this comparison it will be argued that MacIntyre’s desire to enrich his Thomist account of ethics by appeal to Løgstrup’s phenomenology of the ethical demand will ultimately be left unfulfilled. This is because Løgstrup’s phenomenology of the ethical demand is inextricably rooted in a Luther-inspired conception of the self antagonistic to MacIntyre’s own, where, for Løgstrup, recognizing the demand ‘as and for what it is rather than failing to,’ as MacIntyre puts it, constitutively involves recognizing that the self exists in a certain way.
Before Descartes and what Dennis Des Chene called the “divorce between the *anima vegetativa* from the *sensitiva* and *rationalis*” as a consequence of the mechanicism (*Life’s Form*, 2000, p. 5), we find already in the commentaries on *The Soul* by the Jesuits Francisco Suárez (1592 – 1667) and Rodrigo de Arriaga (1548-1617) an intellectualistic tendency aiming to amplify – without any mechanicistic assumptions of course – the distance of the vegetative from the sensitive and rational soul.

Suárez’s *De anima* (dictated in Segovia in 1572, but published in 1621 only) has often attracted the attention of the scholars, as it assembles and combines together elements extending from different traditions: the Thomist, Franciscan and Nominalist viæ are all echoed in his text. In particular, the Franciscan doctrine of the “colligantia potentiarum”, that he names “sympathia”, has often been read by scholars as a mechanism anticipating Descartes’ innatism – or, looking backwards, extending from a certain Augustinian-Franciscan theory of cognition (Augustine, John Duns Scotus, Peter Olivi have been identified with Suárez’s possible sources). According to the mechanism of sympathy, the soul’s power as well as their (cognitive, sensible and vegetative) operations have a common root, the soul; they thus act separately, being nevertheless ‘informed’ of the other’s activities. Instead of reading this doctrine, exposed, as well known, in the third Book of the treatise, with respect to the intellective soul, I shall propose a reading of its usage and presence in the first and second Books, wherein the vegetative and sensitive souls are treated. What actually means, that the powers are rooted in the same soul, and what is the – fundamental – role of attention in the Suárezian account?

As for Arriaga, in his most influential *De anima* (1632) he distinguishes two kinds of life: intentional and physical. The first is ascribed to rational souls only, the latter, comprehending locomotive and vegetative operations, to animals and plants. Starting off with this distinction, I shall try to research where the “divorce” between the vegetative soul and the other powers locates, thereby trying to provide a comparison with Suárez’s account as well.

Both examples will just provide us with a limited case-study; be this as it may, not only both texts have been largely disseminated all over Europe, but they also will help us understanding what is the place of the vegetative soul according to these Jesuits commentaries, and how the Aristotelian *scientia de anima* was interrogated at the dawn of modernity.
Analytic philosophy is often viewed in purely methodological terms – a means for the clarification of concepts by means of ‘analysis’. In this regard, it is viewed as a means through which a system of definitions can be provided in a way that allows for a defence of a particular kind of enlightened realism, against what have been perceived to be the many and various obscurantisms of Hegelianism and its radical ‘continental’ descendents. This is the thesis that analytic philosophy is a species of modernism wherein ‘form followed function’ and meaning was dependent upon the possession of an appropriate ‘method’. However, in this regard, analytic philosophy has remained haunted by the ghost of its origins in mathematics; and in its search for a logic that secures a form of enlightened realism it has become a victim of the very obscurantism that it sought to cure. Analytic philosophy has, it seems, now collapsed back into metaphysics - into Platonism or naturalism – and as a result analysis now fails to clarify and speculation has again trumped method.

In opposition to this view of the collapse of analysis into speculative metaphysics, this paper will examine the submerged political dimension of analytic philosophy – specifically, its deep association with social democratic liberalism in the early-mid 20th century. In so doing it will explore - and ultimately contest – the thesis that analytic philosophy was a species of apolitical ‘analytic modernism’ concerned only with the development of philosophical technique (that was ultimately replaced, after the Second World War, by a scientific naturalism more consonant with classical liberal ideals). On the contrary, ‘analysis’, I will claim, in early decades of the last century, was from the start conceived as a tool for maintaining a particular kind of subjectivity (through a defence of the logically obvious) that was then perceived to be under threat from radical political positions on both the left and the right of the political spectrum. In suggesting this, I will make plea for a reassessment of the significance of philosophical analysis as a socio-political tool and also begin the much needed post-mortem on analytic philosophy in relation to the future of philosophy as an academic discipline.
Sara L. Uckelman (Durham University) “The Syllogisms in Paul of Venice”

Abstract: Paul of Venice’s chapter on syllogisms in the *Logica Magna* is equal parts rehearsal of orthodox Aristotelian logical theory – including the modal syllogistic and an explanation of the mnemonic names given to the valid moods, commentary on (and often dismissal of) earlier 14th-century views, and systematization of the non-Aristotelian but – by the end of the 14th C – still traditional aspects of syllogistic theory – such as the codification of direct and indirect conclusions, regular and irregular syllogisms. And yet, for all that it represents the culmination of 13th- and 14th-century developments in syllogistic theory, this text has been hardly read or studied. This talk will outline the contents of the treatise, highlighting what is distinctive about it, and locate it in the context of other 14th-century developments.
Matteo Vagelli (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) What can Foucault teach us about the relationship between history and philosophy of science?

The nowadays prevailing association of Michel Foucault with the so-called “French theory”, and hence with postmodernism and deconstructionism, has obscured his contribution to the epistemological tradition of which Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem are the most prominent representatives. My objective is to challenge this widespread view by repositioning Foucault as both a historian and a philosopher of science – one who draws upon a tradition of rationalism while concomitantly decisively transforming it.

In order to do so, I would like to further analyse the heated and long-standing question of the relationship between history and philosophy via the relationship between history of science and philosophy of science. Indeed, far from becoming all of a sudden historicized after the “historical turn” of the 1960s, philosophy is still struggling to find a conceptual rationale with the history of science. The difficulty making the Anglophone debate over the so-called “marriage between the history and the philosophy of science” an endless riddle is its being caught in the ambiguity between a normative and a descriptive kind of union. With this respect, what I would like to examine in more detail in this presentation is how Foucault’s works – his analyses of mental and physical illnesses, of disciplines such as psychiatry, clinical medicine or the human sciences – stand with respect to this modernist predicament: how can they avoid to be either blind empirical descriptions or empty philosophical fictions? This will, I hope, enable us to understand how philosophical and historical perspectives are made to interact in his works. Or, in other words, what is the precise model of historicization that he proposes for epistemology.

I believe this can only be done by investigating the role of the present in Foucault and, more specifically, the role that actual scientific norms play in Foucault’s historiography of science. I will particularly draw on his early “archaeological” analyses of psychiatry (Histoire de la folie, 1961), clinical medicine (Naissance de la clinique, 1963) and the human sciences (Les mots et les choses, 1966) in order to show that, contrary to what has been suggested, Foucault’s historical narratives do not imply historicism and relativism, but that they represent instead a particular version of the “presentist” attitude in history of science, as it has been redefined, among others, by N. Jardine and H. Chang. The attempt to demonstrate the convergence of Foucault’s reflections with a substantial portion of contemporary Anglophone HPS debates will, I hope, subvert the scepticism that prevents philosophers and historians of science from engaging in serious readings of his works.
In Jean-Paul Sartre’s early philosophy, we find conflicting accounts of the relation between emotional experience and value. On the one hand, we find a projectivist construal of the emotion-value relation according to which affective states are projections of value. This account is most prominently found in Sartre’s *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* where Sartre characterises emotions as active mechanisms of self-defence against existential hardships: when we are faced with what we experience as an insurmountable difficulty in the form of an impossible task, we react emotionally and project (dis)values on the object causing concern in order to “cover up” the difficulty. On the other hand, Sartre scholars have recently recognised that Sartre seems to work also with a non-projectivist construal of the relationship between emotional experience and value owed to Max Scheler’s influence. According to this conception of emotions, affective states are characterized as potentially a sort of disclosure of value. Values are disclosed to, rather than projected by, the subject of experience. Underlining this account of the emotion-value relation are Sartre’s descriptions of the phenomenology of value stressing that values are given as objective features of our surroundings. At the same time, and to complicate matters, Sartre explicitly rejects also the sort of robust realism about value that conceives its objectivity as specifiable independently of a subjective perspective.

In this paper I offer a reading of Sartre that reconciles these prima facie conflicting claims regarding the emotion-value relation and, more specifically, regarding the notion of the objectivity of value. The central claim is that we should read Sartre as committed to a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value (RD) of the sort championed in more recent times by David Wiggins and John McDowell. There are two claims at the core of RD. First, to think of an object as having value entails to think it appropriate to have a relevant affective response towards the object. This aspect of RD preserves a necessary link between our experiential responses and value and therefore rejects a robust realist view of value. The second claim at the core of RD is that it does not follow from the fact that our conception of a property makes necessary reference to our experiential responses, that then the former is reducible to the latter. In rejecting a reductive account of value, RD rejects a projectivist construal of the emotion-value relation. Thus, I argue that we can make sense of the characterisation of emotional experience as a sort of disclosure of the evaluative features of objects and of the sort of objectivity characterising value. I end by suggesting that the projectivist account of the relation between emotion and value found in the *Sketch* is compatible with the disclosing account: when an event is disclosed to a subject as making evaluational demands that are experienced by the subject as an insurmountable task, she reacts emotionally and projects values to “cover up” the demands.
The philosophical positions of American pragmatists and logical empiricists had many overlaps, most obviously their shared commitment to the championing of empirical means of inquiry over certain styles of *a priori* philosophizing. But the epistemic status of value statements was not among this area of convergence, as the pragmatist C.I. Lewis notes: “It is with respect to problems of evaluation and of ethics that the contrast between logical positivism and pragmatism is strongest.” (1941/1970, 107) The main point of disagreement was whether or not value statements have truth conditions, and consequently on whether value statements can be considered cognitive. Broadly speaking, the disagreement is this: pragmatists thought that value statements are truth-apt and have cognitive content, while logical empiricists rejected this view and endorsed moral non-cognitivism. This analysis of the divergence in views is enforced and repeated in the writings of many pragmatists and logical empiricists (e.g. Reichenbach 1939; Dewey 1939) as well as in the secondary literature (e.g. Richardson 2002; Mormann 2007). Furthermore, it is often thought that this disagreement is strongly embodied in the divergent meta-ethical views of Rudolf Carnap, a logical empiricist, and John Dewey, a pragmatist (e.g. Kaplan 1963; Lewis 1941/1970; Mormann 2007).

Despite this persistent impression of deep-rooted disagreement, in this paper I argue that the true disagreement between Dewey and Carnap (concerning valuation) was minor and better described as a difference in emphasis, especially if we focus on Carnap’s mature philosophy of value (Carnap 1963, 1958/2015). I make this claim in three parts. Firstly, I argue that Dewey and Carnap in fact agreed on many aspects of the issue of cognitive content of value statements. In particular, they both believed that there is a category of valuative statements that are truth-apt as well as a category of value statements that are not truth-apt. Second, I argue that their views diverged only concerning a specific subcategory of value statements, namely, value statements that look purely valuational but which under closer scrutiny can turn out to pack factual components as well. And third, the residual disagreement concerning this subcategory is best described as a difference in emphasis in the languages of their respective theories of valuation, rather than as a disagreement about valuation *per se*. The crucial difference is that Dewey emphasized ordinary valuative language whereas Carnap preferred artificial language systems. They took advantage of different language systems, because they pursued different kinds of philosophical projects: Carnap’s constructed languages were useful for laying out a general account of procedural constraints on rational deductive and inductive thought, while Dewey’s emphasis on ordinary language meant his philosophy of value resonated with and served the resolution of “concrete” moral problems of everyday life. The upshot is that the disagreement between Dewey and Carnap is misconstrued and exaggerated in the literature, and so is the disagreement between pragmatists and logical empiricists, in so far as the lessons from a comparison of Dewey and Carnap translate in to lessons about logical empiricists and pragmatists more generally.
Andreas Vrahimis (Cyprus) - Critical theory and the development of the analytic-continental divide

The historiography of the supposed divide between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy has often focused on the growing opposition between some particular strands of early analytic philosophy, on the one hand, and on the other hand one particular tradition within ‘continental’ philosophy, namely phenomenology (see e.g. Vrahimis 2013, Reynolds & Chase 2011). Despite often having been influenced by the phenomenological tradition, early analytic philosophers used parts of the work of phenomenologists to illustrate fundamental errors that should be avoided by all rigorous philosophy (Glendinning 2006). In the Anglophone philosophical world the term ‘continental philosophy’ was initially employed as shorthand for work done within the bounds of the phenomenological tradition (including its existentialist offshoots). This term, however, gradually came to encompass a variety of quarrelling philosophical schools with conflicting approaches, including critical theory, psychoanalysis, hermeneutics, structuralism, deconstruction, Lebensphilosophie, and some aspects of Neo-Kantianism. Almost all of these traditions, bundled together as ‘continental’, held, to various degrees, a critical stance towards phenomenology, and were either critical or seemingly indifferent towards analytic philosophy.

The existence of various schools of thought (e.g. Pragmatism, Hegelianism, Neo-Kantianism) that are caught between the early analytic and phenomenological traditions has often been conjured up in discourse concerned with bridging the divide. In my paper, I will discuss this image of getting caught in between the two divided extremes with reference to one particular tradition which has been relatively neglected in the relevant philosophical and historiographical literature: critical theory. In this paper, I will trace the history of the various polemical encounters between Frankfurt school critical theorists and analytic philosophers, from the early failure of attempts at aligning the Frankfurt school with the Vienna Circle, up to the Positivismusstreit and its aftermath. Critical theory, I shall argue, is a tradition which rigorously distinguished itself from both phenomenology and analytic philosophy, but also shaped the ways in which we conceive of the analytic-continental divide today.
Especially over the course of the last 25 years or so, Kant’s account of moral motivation has been the subject of intense scholarly debate. More than anything else, the focus of these debates has been the precise role that Kant assigns to “feeling” in moral motivation, in particular the feeling of “respect [Achtung]” for the moral law. Some of those who claim that there is an important role for feeling to play in Kant’s account of moral action suggest that he assigns it this role because of the lingering influence of his British predecessors. Melissa Zinkin, for instance, claims that the role Kant assigns to feeling in moral action illustrates that he “is making a concession to the philosophers of moral sense” (2006, 32). Similarly, A.T. Nuyen argues that Kant “adopts” the moral psychology of David Hume, according to which “it is a passion that provides the psychological push for every action” (1991, 40). Indeed, when comparisons are made between Kant’s understanding of moral motivation and the broadly empirical conception of action common to many British philosophers of the eighteenth century, Hume is often singled out as the appropriate representative of the empirical view. This comparison with Hume is surprising, however, for as Lara Denis notes: “Kant often indicated that he saw Hutcheson as more significant to ethics than Hume” (Denis 2012). Denis’ observation is correct, and my aim in this paper is to clarify Kant’s understanding of the psychology of moral action by placing it in context with his more appropriate British predecessor, Francis Hutcheson. In the first section I explain Hutcheson’s psychology of motivation. I then turn my attention to Kant in section two, where I discuss his conception of the problem of moral motivation, his notion of an incentive, as well as what he believes takes places psychologically when the moral law moves human beings to act. In section three, I discuss three main differences between Hutcheson’s and Kant’s positions. I argue that (1) whereas Hutcheson subscribes to what I call the ‘battle of forces’ model of action, Kant does not, (2) although Hutcheson and Kant agree on a trivial level that all action rests on a desire, for Kant the desire at the basis of moral action is of a fundamentally different sort, the possibility of which Hutcheson does not discuss, namely a rationally generated desire, and (3) for Hutcheson the ultimate ends of actions are fixed by nature, whereas for Kant it is possible for us to rationally adopt ultimate ends of action. In general, my hope is that placing Kant and Hutcheson in contrast with one another will illuminate the nuances of their respective positions as well as determine the extent to which Hutcheson influenced Kant’s understanding of this important issue.
Kirsten Walsh (University of Nottingham) - Newton’s ‘Vegetative Spirit’

Newton presented his *Opticks* and his *Principia* as two parts of a greater project, thus somehow unified. However, commentators often take the *Principia’s* universal gravitation as the key to Newton’s project of unification, with frustrating results. I argue that we can resolve the apparent incoherency in Newton’s system by examining a largely overlooked and unpublished paper from 1672.

1672 was a big year for Newton—and still is for Newton scholarship. In that year he published his first paper on optics. This rejected the received picture of white light as homogenous, fundamental and pure, offering instead a new theory in which white light is a heterogeneous mixture of colours. Newton’s conclusions and original methodology were considered, in equal measures, both ingenious and controversial. That same year, Newton was working on another paper. One he never published. The manuscript, now referred to as ‘Of Natures obvious laws & processes in vegetation’, forms part of Newton’s alchemical corpus. Here, Newton offers a vital agent, a ‘vegetative spirit’. ‘Vegetation’ is understood very generally, to include animal, vegetable and mineral: the “vegetable spirit is radically the same in all things”. And so, Newton’s vegetative spirit is a unifying principle ontologically and, as we shall see, fits within his usual methodological business.

In this manuscript, Newton draws a distinction between mechanical processes—“a gross mechanical transposition of parts”—and vegetative processes. This distinction might be understood as a precursor to the distinction between active and passive principles, thus allowing us to make sense of several puzzling passages in query 23/31 of the *Opticks*. Moreover, in a fascinating passage, Newton proposes a relationship between the vegetative spirit and light, writing “this spirit perhaps is the body of light because both have a prodigious active principle, both are perpetual workers”. He goes on to offer an analogy between processes of mineral vegetation and those of the Creator. And so the manuscript offers insight into the ways in which the various strands of Newton’s scholarly endeavours, including chymistry and theology, were united under one grand scheme.

Newton’s position can be understood as an early deviation from Cartesianism. Where Descartes uses mechanical principles to eliminate both the vegetative and animal souls (retaining only the rational), Newton re-introduces the vegetative, arguing that phenomena such as putrefaction and fermentation cannot be produced by mechanical processes. But Newton’s approach is more original than this contrast with Descartes implies. For one thing, Newton is drawing on the chymical tradition while Descartes has firm botanical roots. For another, Newton’s use of the term ‘vegetative spirit’ is an instance of what I call Newton’s ‘rhetorical style’. Newton took already familiar terms and stretched them to fit his philosophical needs. He did this with many scientific concepts, such as ‘force’ and ‘mass’, and also methodological concepts, such as ‘hypothesis’, ‘query’ and even ‘principle’. In short, he borrowed familiar terms and massaged them to fit his own philosophical picture.

In light of this, Newton’s chymical musings align with the methodology employed in his published works and serve as a link between his optical and mechanical systems.
This paper aims to explore the connection between classical pragmatism (particularly William James and Charles S. Peirce) and sentimentalism. Despite classical pragmatism's close connections with Scottish commonsense philosophy, and despite Peirce's insistence that pragmatism required a form of sentimentalism, little research has been done into the nature of this connection. This paper aims to address this gap.

The paper is split into three short sections. The first section focuses on presenting exactly what a pragmatist version of sentimentalism looks like. According to Peirce, sentimentalism is defined as "the doctrine that great respect should be paid to the natural judgements of the sensible heart" (1893, CP6.292). He defended this position in various forms throughout his career. In 1898 he argued that emotional sentiments should, in cases concerning morality at least, be given precedence over theoretical reason. In 1905 he argued that pragmatism required a version of commonsense philosophy which included sentimentalism. Though James was less explicit about this connection, and often used "sentimentalism" in a pejorative sense, I shall argue that James holds a position very similar to Peirce's. James frequently expressed the view that the "dumb region of the heart" and its responses to our environment should be seen as "our deepest organs of communication" with reality (1896, WB:55). There are interesting differences between the two thinkers on these matters, consisting in disagreements about pluralism and monism, and the role of personal and interpersonal experience.

The second section compares the pragmatist sentimentalism laid out in the first section with the traditional sentimentalisms of Hume and Smith. I present two differences between pragmatist sentimentalism and traditional sentimentalism. The first is the evolutionary nature of pragmatist sentimentalism. James and Peirce hold that our sentiments evolve over time, and do so in response to an experienced reality. According to the pragmatists, our sentiments are not innate but are the products of previous generations' experiences. Whereas other sentimentalisms can be criticised for their tendency to be descriptive rather than normative, I will argue that the evolutionary aspect of pragmatism allows it to avoid this criticism. The second difference concerns the self-directed nature of our sentiments. Both James and Peirce hold that our sentiments are subject to limited self-control. The scope of this self-control, and the circumstances in which it can be exercised, is a matter of disagreement between James and Peirce. I argue that the self-directed nature of pragmatist sentiments allow us to take proper ownership of our emotional reactions.

I end the paper with a suggestion that the sentimentalism of the classical pragmatists should be considered a precursor to contemporary accounts of neosentimentalism. Contrary to sentimentalism, neosentimentalism aims to give an account of sentiments such that they are subject to certain normative constraints of appropriateness. I suggest that the evolutionary and self-directed nature of pragmatist sentiments, as well as its emphasis on communal inquiry, represents a kind of neosentimentalism, and I'll suggest that a pragmatist account of neosentimentalism might offer us a way out of the "wrong kind of reason" problem.
The spectre of Populärphilosophie still haunts German Idealism: not only in the rejection of empirical faculty psychology and rule-based epistemologies, but also in the very question of what philosophy is meant to look like—that is, as a question of style. In this paper, I consider Kant and Schelling’s considerations of popularity and obscurity in respect to style. Beginning with Kant’s reflections on mysticism in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer and On a Recently Prominent Tone of Superiority in Philosophy, I look to identify the characteristics Kant imputes to a ‘mystic style’ against which he wishes to define his own style. With extended reference to Nancy’s Discourse of the Syncope, I connect this opposition to another stylistic dichotomy upon which Kant also insists: that between the popular and the serious.

I then turn to the late Schelling’s rejection of philosophical jargon in the name of a language of the people—one, that is, which is not just for the people but arises from the people. This is—in part, at least—a reaction against, what Schelling perceived as, the difficulty and denseness of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, as the third act of Clara makes clear. Moreover, it is also—and this evident from the later Vorrede to Cousin’s Fragments philosophiques—a rejection of the earlier-held idea that Schelling’s own philosophical and poetic efforts could messianically complete science and inaugurate a new mythology. After 1807, it is not for the philosopher to dictate the perfect science to the people, but for the philosopher to speak with and as the people. I proceed to read Schelling’s affiliation with a kind of ‘popular philosophy’ in the light of Kant’s earlier rejection of popularity: on the one hand, Schelling’s demagogic ideal is obviously to be contrasted with Kant’s style, but, on the other hand, the popular mysticism Schelling espouses in Clara (primarily) is intended as precisely the popularisation of transcendental idealism that Kant still wished for. The final section of the paper attempts to explicate this latter claim.
Niels Wildschut (Vienna) Philosophy and universal history: Reconsidering the dispute between Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottfried Herder

This paper examines the relation between history and philosophy around 1800. The aim is to show that the conflict between “historicism” and “German Idealism” was not as clear cut as often assumed. My main interpretive hypothesis will be that in an age when universal history was still conceived as the main goal of historiography by historians and philosophers alike, the opposition between history and philosophy was not simply one of the empirical vs the a priori. In fact, in their quest for universal history, both philosophers and historians made use of philosophical speculation, and relied on empirical assumptions.

The relation between Kant and Herder will be at the center of this exposition. First, the image of the thinker generally credited for his “historical consciousness” receives a correction, by exhibiting how much his historical thought consisted in a theology of history. Herder’s attempt to work towards a universal history started from the assumption that in history, the same divine harmony was to be found that was characteristic of all of Creation. In his philosophy of history, mankind was educated by God in a providential development.

Second, Kant’s reaction to Herder was also not as transparent as Neo-Kantian historiography had it. At first glance, Kant’s review of Herder’s Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind (1784) seems to consist purely in an epistemological argument: a Critical reprimand of Herder’s dogmatic metaphysics and sloppy methodology. Yet when more of the context of the dispute between Kant and Herder is taken into account, the distribution of philosophical demarcations that the two traditionally represent – pre-Critical vs. transcendental, historical vs. a priori – becomes less unambiguous.

For one, recent Kant scholarship has brought out the importance of the empirical within Kant’s Critical philosophy (Wood), and it has worked out the complexity of the relationship between Herder and Kant, and their intellectual proximity at many stages (Zammito). One upshot of this is that Kant’s strong criticism of Herder can at least partly be understood as a critique of views not so distant from his own. For another, the conception of history which Kant developed in his Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784) as a regulative ideal of practical reason was thoroughly teleological. Kant was comfortable to attribute to nature the power to lawfully organize the course of history towards the highest goal of civic union. Kant’s conception of history was providential, and aimed at the fulfillment of human destiny.

Kant concluded his Idea by stating that his philosophical history is not meant to displace empirical research. Nevertheless, the hegemony of philosophy over the other academic disciplines during the heydays of “German Idealism” seemed to affect exactly that. An analysis of the conflict between Fichte and Ranke, which in various ways mirrored the conflict between Herder and Kant, will show that the antagonism of history and philosophy was more a battle about the hegemony over the field of universal history than it was a self-assertion of historicity per se.
Rachael Wiseman (Durham) ‘Anscombe, Foot, Midgley and Murdoch: A philosophical school?’

Analytic philosophy is associated with a line of founding fathers. Also prominent in its history are the philosophical schools and movements that grew up around dominant male figures. Austin and Wittgenstein drew acolytes, students and followers who learnt at their feet and promulgated the method of ‘ordinary language philosophy’. Logical behaviourism was spread by members of the Vienna Circle and followers of Ryle. The figure of the analytic philosophical sage, a character who figures in many of Murdoch’s novels, appears: a man who speaks gnomically, ruthlessly exposes nonsense and stupidity, inspires admiration and fear in his crowd of young male followers and shuns the company of women.

The dysfunctional dynamics of these philosophical schools are part of analytic philosophy’s folk history. What is absent from that history is the story of four women—Anscombe, Foot, Midgley and Murdoch—who became friends at Oxford University as undergraduates and who remained life-long philosophical companions. This paper will outline a set of questions, methods and theses which they shared and which—we suggest—constitute them as a distinct philosophical school within the history of analytic philosophy. Doing so helps us better to understand each philosopher in her own right and consolidates a substantial body of philosophical work on human nature, broadly construed.

In addition to the philosophical rewards of viewing these women’s work together doing so also provides an opportunity to reflect on the methods and practices of analytic philosophy itself. This is a chance to describe a philosophical school within the analytic tradition that contains neither sage nor acolyte and which starts from and builds upon a shared ethical outlook rather than a commitment to a philosophical method or doctrine. Women who appear in the history of philosophy are often isolated figures whose interlocutors are all men. As well as making them vulnerable to erasure this also renders them unsuitable subjects if we want to enquire into the thorny topic of whether and to what extent the male-dominance in philosophy is responsible for its choice of topics, methods and practices. An isolated woman in dialogue with men is necessarily one who has had to assimilate into the dominant practice. In contrast, when we study a collective of women who forged their philosophical identities when—as Midgley puts it—‘there were fewer men around’ because of conscription during WWII we can see one model of what philosophical practice dominated by women might look like.
Empiricism is a claim about the contents of the mind: its classic slogan is *nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*, ‘there is nothing in the mind (intellect, understanding) which is not first in the senses’. As such, it is not a claim about the fundamental nature of the world as material. My interest in what follows is what I term the materialist appropriation of empiricism. One major component in the transition from a purely epistemological claim about the mind and its contents, to an ontological claim about the nature of the world, is the new focus on brain-mind relations in the eighteenth century. Elsewhere I have examined the cases of Diderot and Bonnet in this story of appropriation. Here I focus on a more Lockean trajectory as exemplified in Joseph Priestley’s 1777 *Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit*. But Locke explicitly ruled out that his inquiry into the logic of ideas amounted to a ‘physical consideration of the mind’. What does it mean, then, for Priestley to present himself as continuing a Lockean tradition, while presenting mental processes as tightly identified with ‘an organical structure such as that of the brain’ (although he was not making a strict identity claim as we might understand it, post-Smart and Armstrong)? One issue here is that of Priestley's source of ‘empirical data’ regarding the correlation and indeed identification of mental and cerebral processes. David Hartley’s theory in his 1749 *Observations on Man* was, as is well known, republished in abridged form by Priestley, but he discards Hartley’s 'vibratory neurophysiology' while retaining the associationist framework. Yet Hartley was at the very least, strongly agnostic about metaphysical issues (and it is difficult to study these authors while bracketing off religious considerations). One could see Locke and Hartley as articulating programs for the study of the mind which were more or less naturalistic (more strongly so in Hartley’s case) while avoiding ‘materialism’ per se; in contrast, Priestley bit the bullet. In this paper I examine how Priestley performs his appropriation and reconstruction of this ‘micro-tradition’, with the sub-issue of the extent to which a materialist philosophy of mind is based on empirical data. I shall also seek to contextualise Priestley within different types of materialist claims, some more focusing on the physical world as a whole, and others on brain-mind relations in particular.
The paper focuses on Priestley’s complex views on the essence of God in connection with his materialism, elaborated in the *Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit* (1777/1782). This issue is crucial if one wishes to get a clear idea of what Priestley’s materialism amounts to -- whether it is mainly a thesis about the material grounds of the human mind (often called “psychological materialism”), or a more far-reaching one about what kind of substances exist in the world (a version of “ontological materialism”). The claim that God may be material allows for the most radical version of ontological materialism according to which *everything* in the world is material, without altogether denying that God exists. In fact, Priestley considers and partially defends at least three different views on the potential materiality of God: (1) an agnostic stance that is his official view, (2) materialism about God based on his own theory of matter, and (3) “gross” materialism about God. The aim of the paper is to analyze these three views, in particular concerning what kind of materialism they support and whether they can contribute to the consistent Christian materialism Priestley envisaged.

Priestley officially holds version (1) and maintains that the essence or substance of God is completely beyond our comprehension (like substances in general, following Locke). But he also deems bolder materialist conceptions of God consistent and defensible, including more far-reaching knowledge claims about the essence of God in general (versions 2 and 3).

(2) Priestley’s theory of matter can serve as a foundation for a (so far undeveloped) materialism about God since it includes that matter is not most fundamentally impenetrable but constituted by the forces of attraction and repulsion: If impenetrability is not an essential property of matter, the main reproach associated with matter is removed since then, matter is not necessarily inert and thus potentially capable of intelligence -- thus offering a plausible basis for both the human and the divine mind, according to Priestley.

(3) The kind of materialism about God that is based on Priestley’s theory of matter would differ from more common forms which Priestley calls a “grosser sort” of it (Rutt edn vol. 3, 299). Nonetheless, there are many pious Christians and early Church Fathers who do maintain “gross” materialism that seem plausible and compatible with Christianity, according to Priestley; the paper will discuss on what grounds he thinks so since he does not offer obvious arguments for this.